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Abstract
This thesis comprises three essays on human resource management. The rst one
studies the e¤ect of on-the-job training on rm productivity using a micro-dataset of a
large rm in Greece for the period 2005 to 2006. The data consist of daily observations
on the productivity of the same workers tracked before, during, and after the receipt of
training. Overall, the empirical ndings show that after the implementation of on-the-job
training, productivity improves by almost 6.5 percent. Results are further complemented
by providing alternative evidence and interpretations for the training e¤ect observed.
The second essay tests how high performance work practices, and work uncertainty
are associated with employee overtime as an indicator of work intensication. It pro-
poses a multiple mediator model in which di¤erent practices act as mediating mecha-
nisms between work uncertainty and employee overtime. Hypotheses are tested using
the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) of 2005. Results indicate that prac-
tices such as training, task rotation, and teamwork consistently appear to have a positive
association with employee overtime, while discretion mechanisms have a negative or no
association with it. Work uncertainty appears to have a strong and positive relationship
with employee overtime as well; however, the mediating role of high performance work
practices seems to account for some, but not all, of this relationship.
The third paper examines the link between task characteristics, employee learning and
career prospects. It aims to address this issue by developing a set of hypotheses testing
how task variety versus task specialization is related to employee learning, and employee
career prospects within an organization. Additionally, it examines the interactive e¤ects
of giving employee discretion, and di¤erent tasks assignments on individual learning and
employee career prospects respectively. Hypotheses are evaluated by analyzing data
from the fourth and the fth wave of the European Working Conditions Survey. Results
indicate that employees exhibit higher learning and higher intentions for career growth
when their jobs involve unrelated task rotation, and complex tasks rather than related
task rotation and monotonous tasks. Estimates support the complementarity hypothesis
as well; however, show that di¤erent types of employee discretion inuence di¤erently
the relationships of interest. The main ndings produced add to the development of a
comprehensive theory for integrating task assignments, learning and career prospects.
The main contributions of each paper can be summarized as follows. In the rst
paper, the dataset provides an unusual opportunity of using direct measures of rm
productivity, exact information on content, length, purpose of training, and o¤ers the
possibility to monitor the rm over some time. The before-and-after body of information
along with the training activity that took place at a specic point in time provide a
unique laboratory to address methodological challenges encountered throughout this line
of research; particularly the problems of unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of
training. This makes an important contribution to previous literature that had di¢ culty
in isolating and then measuring accurately the impact of training.
In the second paper, the study focuses on how high performance work practices are
related to work intensication in the form of longer working hours. In this context,
empirically basic hypothesis concerning the implications of working longer has generally
not been tested. As it appears, there is scarcity of data availability on e¤ort and much
of the measures on work intensication are in a subjective form. However, spending
longer hours at work as a more objective measure has been highly neglected. The paper
aims to ll this gap. Further, it gives emphasis to other signicant factors contributing
to work intensication, and in particular examines how uncertainty at work could be
driving some of the employee overtime. It adds to previous literature by arguing that this
positive relationship could be mediated by the implementation of high performance work
practices. If it is accepted that this has been an era of work intensication, then a better
knowledge of possible sources of work intensication contributes to our understanding of
this phenomenon.
In the third paper, it is pointed out that research on careers has examined whether
rotating employees is a means through which individuals learn and develop their careers.
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Here, it is conjectured though that the type of rotation might be of di¤erent importance
in inuencing learning and, by extension, the way individual careers are shaped. Also,
it departs from previous research by supporting the idea that task assignments must be
combined with a certain level of discretion, aiming to observe whether career advancement
can be better leveraged through the possible complementarities between task assignments
and employee discretion. Finally, previous ndings seem somehow inconclusive and they
often vary depending on the context. The latter issue is addressed using broader datasets
to evaluate the hypothesized relationships.
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Resumen
Esta tesis está compuesta por tres ensayos sobre la gestión de recursos humanos. El
primero estudia el efecto de la formación en el trabajo en la productividad de la em-
presa usando una micro base de datos de una empresa grande griega entre los años 2005
y 2006. La base de datos consta de observaciones diarias sobre la productividad de un
mismo grupo de empleados tomadas antes, durante y después de recibir formación. Glob-
almente, los resultados empíricos muestran que tras la implementación de la formación
en el trabajo, la productividad mejora en casi un 6.5 por ciento. Estos resultados se
complementan con evidencias e interpretaciones alternativas relacionadas con el efecto
de formación observado.
El segundo ensayo evalúa cómo las prácticas de trabajo de alto desempeño y la incer-
tidumbre del trabajo están asociadas con la intensicación del trabajo medida en horas
extras. El ensayo propone un modelo con múltiples mediadores en el que las diferentes
prácticas actúan como mecanismos mediadores entre la incertidumbre en el trabajo y el
tiempo extra. Las hipótesis son probadas usando la encuesta europea sobre las condi-
ciones de trabajo (EWCS) del año 2005. Los resultados indican que prácticas tales como
la formación, la rotación de tareas y el trabajo en equipo están consistentemente asoci-
adas con el tiempo extra. Por su parte, los mecanismos discrecionales están asociados
negativamente o bien no tienen ninguna asociación con el tiempo extra. También, la
incertidumbre laboral parece tener una relación fuerte y positiva con las horas extras.
Sin embargo, el papel mediador de las prácticas de trabajo de alto desempeño parece
eliminar una parte de esta relación.
El tercer ensayo examina el vínculo entre las características de las tareas, el apren-
dizaje de los empleados y las perspectivas de carrera. En particular, el artículo desarrolla
un conjunto de hipótesis para probar cómo la variedad de tareas (frente a la especial-
ización) está relacionada con el aprendizaje de los empleados. Además, el ensayo relaciona
el asunto con el tema principal de este estudio al examinar como las asignaciones diver-
sas de tareas están asociadas con las perspectivas de carrera de los empleados dentro
de una organización. Finalmente, examina la complementariedad potencial de otorgar
discrecionalidad a los empleados, y cómo esto contribuye al aprendizaje de los empleados
y sus perspectivas de carrera. Para el análisis los datos fueron recolectados de las EWCS
de los años 2005 y 2010. En resumen, los resultados indican que los empleados exhiben
mayor aprendizaje y mayores intenciones de avanzar en su carrera cuando sus trabajos
involucran rotaciones de tareas inconexas y tareas complejas en vez de rotaciones y tareas
monótonas. Los resultados también apoyan la hipótesis de la complementariedad.
Las principales contribuciones de cada artículo pueden resumirse como sigue. En el
primero, la base de datos ofrece una oportunidad inusual para usar medidas directas
de productividad empresarial, información exacta sobre el contenido, la duración y el
propósito de la formación. Así mismo ofrece la posibilidad de monitorear la empresa a
lo largo de algún tiempo. La información del antes y el después junto con la actividad
de formación llevada a cabo en un punto especíco del tiempo constituye un laboratorio
único para enfrentar los retos metodológicos comunes en esta línea de investigación; en
particular, problemas de heterogeneidad no observada y endogeneidad de la formación.
Esta es una contribución importante a la literatura previa que tuvo dicultad en aislar
y por lo tanto medir con precisión el impacto de la formación.
En el segundo artículo, el estudio se enfoca en cómo las prácticas de trabajo de alto
rendimiento se relacionan con la intensicación del trabajo medida como horas de trabajo
adicionales. En este contexto, empíricamente no se han probado hipótesis que conciernan
las implicaciones de trabajar más horas. Como parece, hay escasez de datos disponibles
sobre esfuerzo y muchas de las medidas de intensicación de trabajo son subjetivas en
su forma. Mientras, la variable de pasar más horas en el trabajo, más objetiva, ha
sido largamente desatendida. El artículo pretende cerrar este vacío. Además, subraya
que existen otros factores signicativos que contribuyen a la intensicación laboral, y
examina cómo la incertidumbre en el trabajo puede estar creando parte de las horas
extra. Contribuye a la literatura previa al argumentar que esta relación positiva puede
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estar mediada por la implementación de prácticas de trabajo de alto rendimiento. Si
se acepta que esta ha sido una era de intensicación laboral, entonces un conocimiento
mejor de la posibles fuentes de intensicación contribuye a nuestro conocimiento de este
fenómeno.
En el tercer ensayo, se puntualiza que la investigación sobre las carreras ha examinado
si la rotación de empleados es un medio a través del cual los individuos aprenden y
desarrollan sus carreras. Aquí, sin embargo, se conjetura que el tipo de rotación puede
inuenciar el aprendizaje de diversas formas y, por extensión, la forma en la que las
carreras individuales son formadas. También se aleja de la investigación previa en cuanto
que apoya la idea que las asignaciones de tareas deben combinarse con cierto nivel de
discrecionalidad, tratando de observar si el avance en la carrera puede apalancarse mejor a
través de posibles complementariedades entre asignación de tareas y discrecionalidad del
empleado. Finalmente, resultados anteriores parecen de alguna manera no concluyentes
y varían frecuentemente con el contexto. Este problema es solucionado usando bases de
datos más amplias para evaluar las relaciones determinadas por las hipótesis.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Human Resource Management Issues
Over the years, there has been developed a fair amount of literature promoting the advan-
tages of using high-involvement or high-commitment human resource practices. The dom-
inant trend in this line of research has argued that the use of human resources practices
will be reected in better rm performance (e.g. Arthur 1994; Huselid 1995; MacDu¢ e
1995; Koch andMcGrath 1996). One part of these studies has focused on the e¤ects of the
individual practices (e.g. Bartel 1994; Koch and McGrath 1996; Aragón-Sanchez, Barba-
Aragón, and Sanz-Valle 2003). Among them, extensive training, employee participation,
job redesign, team-based production systems, and performance-contingent incentive com-
pensation are widely believed to improve the performance of organizations. The other
part has moved focus on the interaction e¤ects between practices considering the overall
conguration of aggregation of di¤erent practices on rm performance (e.g. MacDu¢ e
1995; Delaney and Huselid 1996; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997; Cappelli and
Neumark 2001).
A related approach in the literature has aimed to identify how their greater individual
or bundled use is further linked to di¤erent outcomes. Scholars have argued that organi-
zations adopt various human resource practices in order to improve individual learning
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in terms of skills and abilities, as well as enhance employee career prospects inside the
organization, or both. Such practices include extensive training and job rotation as mech-
anisms through which employees accumulate more human capital (Eriksson and Ortega
2006) or discretion mechanisms which has been found to be closely associated not only
with increased performance (Osterman 1995; Ortega 2009) and the quality of production
(Ichniowski and Shaw 1999; Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, and Kalleberg 2000); but also
with giving employees the opportunity to develop new skills, and master a wider range
of tasks and responsibilities (Parker 1998; Grant and Parker 2009).
The fact that these practices yield positive results is not doubtful. Nevertheless, there
are perceptions suggesting that although the implementation of human resource practices
leads to numerous positive outcomes, it may also cause negative consequences, particu-
larly on the quality of employee working life. Previous research assess the implications
of these practices on negative experiences at work, including greater tension, insu¢ cient
time to perform tasks, and missing deadlines (see more in Godard 2001; White et al.
2003). This is because, in the language of many scholars, human resource practices in-
crease e¤ectiveness by creating conditions where employees become highly involved in
the rm and work hard to achieve its goals (Arthur, 1994; Wood and de Menezes 1998).
Central here is the argument that positive performance outcomes resulted from the in-
troduction of such practices may actually arise through the work intensication process.
All in all, previous developments in the eld of human resource management give
us many opportunities to explore additional intriguing aspects of it. Despite the rich
repertoire of studies, there is still a lot of work to be done and further research is strongly
encouraged in order to overcome limitations, ll empirical gaps, and address questions
that have been unanswered in the literature. This thesis builds on an extensive body
of past research on the impact of human resource practices on di¤erent outcomes and
particularly attempts to shed some light on three di¤erent human resource management
issues.
2
1.2 Thesis Structure
In this section, an overall perspective of the context of the thesis is provided. The second
chapter is dedicated on the essay entitled The impact of on-the-job training on rm
productivity: The case of a bakery. The essay focuses on the e¤ects of an individual
human resource practice, on-the-job training. Previous work has mainly examined the
e¤ect of employee training using data from multiple rms, while others have adopted a
case study approach (e.g. Bartel 1994; Black and Lynch 1996). There have been few
studies outside the United States on the impact of human capital investments, such as
training, on productivity. In addition, the majority of empirical studies on the employee
training-productivity relationship are limited to very large rms, and little is known about
the extent to which existing results are representative for smaller rms. The rst study
aims to extend previous work and answers, mainly, how the productivity of a company
located in Greece has changed after the introduction of on-the-job training. It further
aims to explain how extracting information from the productivity records of a single
rm made it possible to avoid measurement errors and deciencies frequently observed
in previous studies, as suggested by Bartel (1995; 2000).
The third chapter presents the essay entitled High performance work practices, work
uncertainty, and employee overtime. The other side of the story. Overall the essay
concentrates on the relationship between human resource practices and employee overtime
as an indicator of work intensication. In the literature, one of the main presumptions
is that the performance gains from human resources practices might arise from work
intensication (e.g. Ramsay, Scholaries, and Harley 2000; Godard 2001; Green 2004).
This has meant that scholars were encouraged to search alternative trajectories through
which human resource practices could be studied. Thus, here using a broader dataset
the paper seeks to evaluate the association between a variety of human resource practices
and work intensication. Understanding this is important because the human resource
practices thesis underpinning the benets stemming from the adoption of these practices
has been developed at a time work has been severely intensied.
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The fourth one focuses on the essay entitled Learning through task variety versus
task specialization: Climbing a stairway to heaven. Who gets there?The paper aims to
explore learning and career implications of di¤erent task assignments. On relevance to
this study is the literature on organization and individual learning which has indicated
a number of references of how the learning rate might be a¤ected by task specialization,
related or unrelated task variation (Darr, Argote, and Epple 1995; Fischer and Ittner
1999; Schilling, Vidal, Ployhart, and Marangoni 2003). The literature on careers is also
relevant and has given attention on the importance of task assignments supporting that
they are a primary source of career learning (Campion, Cheraskin, and Stevens 1994). It
is still unclear, however, whether employee career advancement is driven by learning from
task variety or task specialization. This study extends previous literature and focuses
on the employee learning and career advancement implications of task assignments in
conjunction. This is important both for managers and employees because in leveraging
experience they need to weigh the gains from specialized versus diverse experience in
inuencing not only learning and productivity, but also employeesability to take more
responsibility and advance their career within an organization.
4
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Chapter 2
The Impact of On-the-Job Training
on Firm Productivity: The Case of
Bakery
2.1 Introduction
It is evident that there have been several attempts to empirically explore the impact of
employee training on rm productivity. These have largely taken advantage of various
datasets and focused on di¤erent types of training and productivity measures to test this
relationship. In general, studies nd support for the prediction that training contributes
signicantly to higher productivity growth (Bartel 1994, 1995; Black and Lynch 1996;
Koch and McGrath 1996; Barrett and OConnell 2001). While such studies are numerous,
and even though ndings are reported to be positive and signicant, they do not always
depict a consistent picture. There is an observed variation in results attributed to the
unique situations of rms or due to the fact that many of the studies in the literature
contain serious methodological aws which precludes relying on their results (Bartel
2000).
For instance, a large number of scholars have contributed to this research by exploit-
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ing challenging broad cross-sectional datasets. However, ndings stemming from these
studies have been hampered by failure in correcting for the endogeneity of the training
decision and had di¢ culty to account for unobserved heterogeneity (Bartel 1994; Black
and Lynch 1996; Barrett and OConnell, 2001). On the other hand, researchers have
used panel data at the rm (Black and Lynch 1996; Barrett and OConnell 2001) or
the industry-level (Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen 2006) in an e¤ort to tackle these
problems. However, studies using rm-level data have been hindered by the use of indi-
rect measures of productivity such as changes in wage as proxy of workersproductivity
and not actual productivity data as well as by poor measures of the training content
or duration (Bartel 1995). Besides, the use of industry level data su¤ers from the fact
that matching information at the industry-level engenders a great loss of micro-level
information that may result in aggregation biases (Colombo and Stanca 2008).
In an e¤ort to address the aforementioned issues, at least partly, researchers have
started to turn attention to more detailed data gathered from one or few companies
which provide the possibility to obtain specic information on the role of training, and
the diverse production processes adopted (Bartel 1995; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi
1997) as well as rely on more direct measures of productivity. Although this approach
helps to avoid the aforementioned methodological aws, results stemming from case stud-
ies may fail to correct entirely for the endogeneity bias. Also, by denition case studies
lead to the generalization problem according to which ndings stemming from unique
cases are very di¢ cult to generalize to other contexts; whereas in the case of broader
datasets, this problem is obviated.
There are both pros and cons attached to either of the approaches. Attempting to
puzzle out this question, a review of the literature on studies that have estimated the
impact of training on rm productivity under di¤erent types of datasets concludes that
broad datasets are su¤ering from a number of biases. On the other hand, information
extracted from one or very few companies has the potential to tackle the problems encoun-
tered in the large-sample studies. Specically, there are three main ways to collect the
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right data using insider econometrics to study productivity and get convincing evidence
of the e¤ects of adopting training practices; cross-organization studies based on plant
visits, single-rm event studies, or plant visits and interviews conducted at few plants of
a particular industry (see more Bartel 2000; Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2004).
In the present study, I use daily data derived from a single large company in Greece
in an e¤ort to identify the e¤ects of on-the-job training on rm productivity. The dataset
contains information on content, length, and purpose of training activity applied as well
as a direct measure of productivity. A number of comprehensive controls have also been
incorporated. Using these data, the paper contributes to the existing literature in sev-
eral ways. First, the dataset provides an unusual opportunity of using precise measures
of rm productivity, that is, the number of pieces produced per minute of production.
Second, the availability of detailed information on training and daily information on pro-
ductivity allow dealing with a number of problems, such as unobserved heterogeneity
and endogeneity of training. Third, I am able to account for other factors that might
impact the change in productivity including production order, resting time, and a di¤er-
ent type of training. Fourth, I check the robustness of the main results in the baseline
specication by focusing on subsamples. Finally, in addition to the main question and
empirical ndings, I examine and discuss alternative explanations of the training impact
on productivity.
2.2 Previous Research
Previous work on the productivity e¤ects of training reports evidence supporting that
investment in training helps rms to develop more qualied employees that in return
can improve rm performance. An indicative piece of work is presented by Bartel (1994)
who measures the e¤ect of employer-provided training on productivity utilizing rm-level
data. The author uses a survey from 1986 on personnel policies and economic charac-
teristics of 495 manufacturing business lines and nds evidence that companies which
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implement training programs experience very high productivity levels. Further, Bartel
(1995) reports ndings of a positive and signicant e¤ect of formal on-the-job training
on wage growth and job performance using a di¤erent dataset obtained from the per-
sonnel records of a single large rm, operating in the manufacturing sector, from 1986
to 1990. Her study shows that focusing on a single rm helps to control for individual
heterogeneity in the estimations of the training impact on performance, as well as avoid
important measurement problems that are commonly observed in the literature. Barrett
and OConnell (2001) further contribute to our understanding of the employee training-
productivity relationship by following a conceptual framework in which investments in
training, general versus specic1, are associated with rm productivity. Their sample is
collected from manufacturing, construction, and private service companies by carrying
out two separate surveys that took place in 1993 and 1996-1997 respectively. Their rst
estimates reveal that the impact of the entire training activity is positive and signicant,
but the test of the di¤erential e¤ects of the two types of training shows that only general
training has a statistically positive e¤ect on productivity. In addition, work presented by
Aragón-Sanchez, Barba-Aragón, and Sanz-Valle (2003) estimates the e¤ects of training
on rm e¤ectiveness and protability on a dataset collected from a questionnaire lled
by 457 European SMEs in 1997-1998. Their ndings demonstrate that training aiming
to transfer specic and job-related skills impacts positively rm e¤ectiveness but not
rm protability. They further show that on-the-job training and training o¤ered inside
the company with in-house trainers is positively associated with e¤ectiveness and prof-
itability. Training performed in the rm by the guidance of outside trainers is positively
associated only with employee involvement in the company and quality, whereas short
outdoor courses show a negative relation to protability.
Research on employee training belongs to a larger literature which evaluates the e¤ects
1Barrett and OConnell (2001) use the concepts of general and specic training as suggested by
Becker (1975) who denes general training as the type of training that increases the productivity, by
equal amounts, of the rm where it was applied and of other rms, and specic training as the type of
training which only increases the productivity of the rm where it was provided.
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of di¤erent individual or bundles of human resource practices and assess whether they
can yield better rm outcomes. Examples of such studies include the empirical paper of
Koch and McGrath (1996) which tests the impact of formal training on labor productivity
along with another set of human resource practices using a sample of 319 business units.
Their key nding with respect to this practice shows that rms of high capital intensity
that systematically train their workers tend to enjoy better productivity levels than rms
that do not train their employees. Similarly, Black and Lynch (1996) test the impact
of human capital investments on productivity of manufacturing and non-manufacturing
rms incorporating di¤erent dimensions of employer-provided training programs includ-
ing formal, computer, teamwork and supervisor training. Using establishment level data
from 1993 they nd that in manufacturing, the more a rm invests on o¤-the-job train-
ing, the more its productivity increases, whereas in non-manufacturing, investments in
improving employeescomputer competencies lead to higher establishment productivity
levels. Additionally, Black and Lynch (2001) nd that certain human resource practices
such as employee participation in decision making, incentive based compensation and
training are associated with higher rm productivity. They analyse a survey dataset and
their main ndings with respect to training reveal that when using cross-sectional data,
training has a positive e¤ect on productivity. However, when they try to account for
the possible endogeneity of training by controlling for unobserved xed e¤ects, ndings
seem to be insignicant. Other studies show that a set of interrelated human resource
practices such as recruitment and hiring, extensive training rather than changes in in-
dividual practices are linked not only to greater productivity outcomes (Ichniowski et
al. 1997) but also to better quality in rms (MacDu¢ e 1995), better corporate nancial
performance and lower employee turnover (Huselid 1995).
In summary, previous work on the impact of training, studied individually or as in-
terrelated human resource practices, reports positive results with some types of training
including formal and general training to cause a greater e¤ect than others. Each con-
tributes to out better understanding of the implications of the training activity. Also,
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these studies provide guidance for further research suggesting that more thorough analy-
sis of the topic is still needed in order to address methodological challenges and identify
whether the e¤ects measured are indeed due to the training activity.
2.3 Data Description
I use data from a single companys personnel les and information extracted from face-
to-face interviews with the production manager in an e¤ort to understand the production
processes and the nature of the training activity applied. In particular, the data upon
which the paper is based are assembled from a family-owned company that produces
confectionery and bakery products in Greece. Currently, it employs almost 350 employees
in all its facilities and is one of the largest companies in the industry nationally2. The
company owns a main production facility comprised of separate production lines operated
by nearly 30 individual workers. Production workers work jointly to produce pieces of
di¤erent bakery products. In particular, they form groups consisted of 3 to 5 and each
group is responsible for the operation of one production line. Given that heterogeneity
in production processes and outputs often limit the persuasiveness of empirical studies, I
sought to minimize this problem by restricting observations to one production line. This
production line consists of one machine that produces four types of non-seasonal small
breads of di¤erent avours which have similar characteristics e.g. shape and size, require
analogous processing times and baking methods, and di¤er slightly in the making process.
In the case of two out of the four small breads, one type of small bread with chocolate
and one type of small bread with raisin, the production process is more automated
and the ingredients are introduced before the machine starts producing the nal pieces.
2Greece, similar to other European member states, has its own denition of what constitutes a
small, medium, or a large sized enterprise. Based on the sta¤ headcount criterion of the Hellenic
Organization of Small and Medium Enterprises and Handicraft in Greece, enterprises employing fewer
than 100 employees are small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and enterprises that exceed this cut-o¤
are classied as large. The European Union uses a di¤erent threshold which categorizes companies with
fewer than 250 employees as SMEs and companies with more than this number as large. Following either
the Greek or the European concept, the company falls into the large company classication.
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However, in the case of the other products, two types of small breads with sesame seeds,
there is higher employee-product interaction because the ingredients are placed manually
and each person on the line is responsible for coating the pieces with water and then
sprinkling each to sesame seeds.
Below, I explain how extracting the aforementioned and additional information from
the productivity records of a single rm made it possible to avoid measurement errors and
deciencies frequently observed in previous studies, as suggested mainly by Bartel (1995,
2000). First, very often studies use indirect measures of productivity such as the indi-
vidual wage rates. Here, the measure of productivity is the number of pieces per minute
produced by a specic machine tracked before, during, and after the receipt of training.
Given the importance of working time as a component of productivity growth, studies
that measure productivity not accounted for the time worked have reported less reliable
results. Thus, a productivity ratio that includes what is produced and production times
seem to be of great importance. The second prerequisite refers to the misrepresentation
of the training duration in the data and to inaccurate denitions of di¤erent training
activities applied in each rm. According to Bartel (1995) there is evidence that rms
usually adopt training practices that last merely few days. Therefore, datasets which
describe training duration in terms of weeks tend to misrepresent the true duration of
the activity and in extension its impact on productivity. In addition, di¤erent types or
di¤erent dimensions of training cause di¤erent e¤ects on productivity as well (Barrett
and OConnell 2001). Thus, specifying the training activity adopted is very important
yet sometimes overlooked. In addressing these issues, I collected information regarding
the exact duration of the employee training in days, and the nature of training activity
applied.
What the interview with the production and the human resource manager revealed is
that at the end of 2005, the company decided to update the skills of the employees working
in the production units of the factory mainly due to the increase in incidences of delay in
production and defective products observed the last months. There are various reasons
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that might have caused these problems starting from the orientation training period
during which the employees were exposed on a wide range of machinery equipment. It
might be the case that the problems in the production units, among others, arose either
because the trainees received too much information during their induction within the
company to be assimilated in a period of few weeks. A second explanation might be
that the information transmitted to employees was too general and they never really
understood the particular specications of each machine. Therefore, when the employees
were assigned to work on a specic type of machine, they failed to work at their highest
potential. Another possible reason is failure to pay attention to details or the increase of
careless mistakes because of the daily routine or the repetitive nature of tasks.
The main step the company followed in alleviating the delays in production, in reduc-
ing defective products, and in extension ensuring maximum productivity was to introduce
training in order to improve the technical and professional skills of the employees working
on machine operation and production. In particular, the employees were trained on how
to set up and assemble the components of the machine, how to warm it up, and how to
dismantle it properly. In addition, they were trained elaborately on how to wash each
component of the equipment, how to check for missing parts by using the metal detector,
and nally how to operate it according to the manufacturers specications. On-the-job
training lasted four days and during that period the production process was not inter-
rupted given that the training time was used to produce current output. In short, the
employees were producing whilst the manager was showing them how to operate the ma-
chine properly and since the task is simple there was not any major interruption in the
production process by explaining how to use the machine and how to coordinate better
their activities.
Another characteristic highlighted by Bartel (2000) is the number of observations
included in studies. They should cover a period enough in order to be able to draw
conclusions and observe better whether employee skill acquisition and productivity gains
are depreciating after some time. In this case, the initial number of observations of
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daily information on worker productivity was 710 over the time period covering August
1st, 2005 until February 29th, 2006. However, valid observations fell to 686 since some
cases with incomplete data dropped out of the dataset. As mentioned before, daily
observations belong to the periods before, during, and after the training activity was
initiated. The period after training (more than 4 months) is considered su¢ cient to
reveal any depreciation of the training e¤ect, since the task performed is not subject to
changes and without any special complexities.
Bartel (2000) further points out a number of pitfalls encountered in existing literature
that should be avoided; such as selecting high performing employees for the training pro-
gram, informing the employees that their performance will be monitored after the training
program, ignoring the impact of operating in a new environment, ignoring the costs of
training, extrapolating ndings based on a small sample of employees to a larger group.
These issues are addressed in the following ways; rst, since all production employees
participated in the training activity, there is no selection bias. Second, the performance
of employees is monitored in general as part of the daily duties of the production man-
ager. Third, pre and post training employees are working under the same scheme in the
same environment. Fourth, since employees were producing while they were receiving
training, it can be claimed that there is not any signicant cost resulting from the time
lost on training if production was paused. Finally, although the study is based on a small
sample of employees which limits the generalization of the ndings, it provides a very
thorough analysis of the topic which can complement ndings from larger scale studies.
2.4 Measures and Empirics
Using these data, I am able to estimate the impact of on-the-job training on productivity.
Output is the number or pieces produced and the input is the production time. The
number of pieces produced uctuates more (Figure 1, e.g. small bread with chocolate)
than the production time (Figure 2), and the former is further driving the observed
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uctuation in productivity (Figure 3).
Figure 1. Production for Small Bread with Chocolate
Figure 2. Production Time for Small Bread with
Chocolate
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Figure 3. Productivity for Small Bread with Chocolate
Information on production and production times was recorded from the production
manager who was keeping daily record of the number of pieces produced along with the
beginning and ending production times. Based on this record, I measure productivity
in terms of number of pieces per minute, and in the analysis its log is taken in order to
observe the percentage change in productivity levels. Additional information on training
comes either from the employers reports about the number of days the workers spent on
training or from the production managers description of the training activity. On-the-
job training takes the value of 1 for all the dates during and after training and 0 for all
the dates before. Besides the training variable, I include a regressor for the production
time which is measured in minutes and varies to a considerable extent among the four
products. In the estimations that follow, I include the log of the production time along
with four dummies for each product denoted as small bread chocolate, small bread raisin,
small bread roll3, and small bread sesame, which take the value of 1 when the employees
3For simplicity reasons, the one small bread of sesame is named small bread roll to distinguish it from
the other type of small bread with sesame.
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produce one of them and 0 otherwise, with the second one used as benchmark. Some
data description and summary statistics are reported in Table 1, and Table 2 reports
correlations. As shown, on-the-job training is positively correlated with productivity,
whereas production time is negatively and very highly correlated with it. The highest
correlation is observed between the small bread sesame and production time.
Table 1. Data Description and Summary Statistics
Variables Denitions N Mean Std. Min Max
Dev.
1. Productivity Number of pieces 686 12.005 4.735 3.571 34.444
produced per minute
2. On-the-job Dummy variable equal 0 706 0.715 0.452 0 1
Training before on-the-job training
and 1 after on-the-job
training
3. Production Production time in 686 22.551 12.062 9 65
Time minutes for all products
4. Small Bread Dummy variable equal to 1 706 0.249 0.433 0 1
Chocolate when employees produce
small bread with chocolate
5. Small Bread Dummy variable equal to 1 706 0.252 0.435 0 1
Raisin when employees produce
small bread with raisin
6. Small Bread Dummy variable equal to 1 706 0.249 0.433 0 1
Roll when employees produce
small bread with sesame
(one type)
7. Small Bread Dummy variable equal to 1 706 0.249 0.433 0 1
Sesame when employees produce
small bread with sesame
(second type)
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Table 2. Correlations
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Productivity 1.000
2. On-the-job Training 0.078* 1.000
3. Production Time -0.760* -0.004 1.000
4. Small Bread Chocolate 0.210* 0.001 -0.304* 1.000
5. Small Bread Raisin 0.412* -0.002 -0.282* -0.335* 1.000
6. Small Bread Roll 0.061 0.001 -0.282* -0.332* -0.335* 1.000
7. Small Bread Sesame -0.684* 0.001 0.869* -0.332* -0.335* 0.332* 1.000
* p< 0.05
An ordinary least squares regression model is undertaken in which productivity is
regressed on on-the-job training, production time, small bread chocolate, small bread
roll, and small bread sesame. Consider the following equation:
logyit = 
0Xit + 
0Zit + Eit
where y is productivity;
Xit is the coe¢ cient of on-the-job training;
Zit is a vector of coe¢ cients on production time, and each product;
Eit is the idiosyncratic component of the error term.
Table 3 shows that the adoption of on-the-job training at the rm improves produc-
tivity by almost 6.5 percent. The coe¢ cient of the log production time shows a negative
and signicant e¤ect on productivity with a sign as expected implying that when produc-
tion time increases, the e¤ort of the employees diminishes considerably. The coe¢ cients
of all other variables turn out to be negative and signicant, and depict variation in the
productivity of each product. Indicatively, the coe¢ cient of small bread sesame shows
that its productivity is less by nearly 0.07 units than the productivity of small bread
roll and the coe¢ cient of small bread roll demonstrates that its productivity is less than
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the productivity of small bread chocolate by 0.06 units. The R-squared of the model is
almost 83 percent indicating a very high explanatory power of the betas.
Further, the baseline specication is extended by estimating the impact of on-the-job
training on the productivity of each individual product using the log productivity of each
small bread as the dependent variable (Log Productivity Small Bread Chocolate, Log
Productivity Small Bread Raisin, Log Productivity Small Bread Roll, Log Productivity
Small Bread Sesame). The models reveal that on-the-job training has a positive and
signicant e¤ect on the productivity of the small bread with chocolate and both small
breads with sesame (Models 2, 4, and 5), In contrast, the productivity of the small bread
with raisin does not seem to be a¤ected (Model 3). Illustratively, the results depict that
a 1 percent increase in training stimulates a 5.2 increase in productivity of small bread
chocolate, a 5.8 percent increase in productivity of the one type of small bread with
sesame, and a 7.8 percent increase of the other type.
As mentioned in the previous section, there is a di¤erence in the production process
among the small breads with chocolate or raisin, and the small breads with sesame
seeds. In the former case, the employees interact less with the products, whereas in the
latter case, there is more interaction because the ingredients have to be added manually.
This di¤erence could shed light on the observed variation of the impact of training on
the productivity levels among them, extrapolating employeesability to a¤ect more the
productivity of products when there is less automation.
These results help to answer questions regarding the alignment of the impact of
training on rm productivity with the nancial returns resulting form that impact. This
step of the analysis estimates the increase in earnings per hour of production using the
estimates and the selling price of each product. The calculations show that for the small
bread chocolate earnings increase by 25.68 euro per hour. In contrast, earnings for the
small bread raisin slightly decrease by 0.12 euro per hour. For the small bread roll
and small bread sesame, earnings increase by 21.78 and 14.94 euro per hour respectively.
Notably, the signicant e¤ects found are also nancially meaningful. It is also remarkable
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to mention the big di¤erences observed in the increase in earnings between the products.
At this point, one can argue that an increase in nancial returns could be attributed to
other causes as well, however this is highly unlike given that the observed period is too
short for big changes to take place and productsattributes or quality did not change.
Table 3. Estimates of Ordinary Least Squares
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Log Log Log Log Log
Productivity Productivity Productivity Productivity Productivity
Small Bread Small Bread Small Bread Small Bread
Chocolate Raisin Roll Sesame
On-the-job 0.064*** 0.052** -0.0002 0.058*** 0.078**
Training (0.015) (0.026) (0.027) (0.017) (0.037)
Log Production -0.677*** -0.779*** -0.780*** -0.953*** -0.203***
Time (0.027) (0.042) (0.048) (0.034) (0.070)
Small Bread -0.141***
Chocolate (0.019)
Small Bread -0.198***
Roll (0.019)
Small Bread -0.261***
Sesame (0.031)
Constant 4.537*** 4.686*** 4.868*** 5.114*** 2.521**
(0.077) (0.118) (0.136) (0.098) (0.254)
Observations 686 171 173 171 171
R2 0.826 0.685 0.613 0.833 0.063
AdjustedR2 0.825 0.681 0.608 0.831 0.052
*Statistically signicant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
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2.4.1 Alternative explanations and additional evidence of the
impact of on-the-job training:
The detained data obtained help to answer other training questions. First, information
on the number of days of training allow checking the extent training duration a¤ects
productivity. Second, information regarding production order, resting times, working
days, and an o¤-the-job training activity applied in the company allow controlling for
a number of other factors that may inuence productivity, besides the introduction of
on-the-job training. Third, information on starting and nishing production times allow
estimating whether the e¤ect of training on productivity di¤ers depending on the length
of production time. Again in this section the baseline specication is extended and results
are presented below.
2.4.2 Hawthorne e¤ect vs. Opportunity cost:
In the next step, I estimate whether productivity has improved or not during the train-
ing period in order to identify any important opportunity cost attached to it or any
Hawthorne e¤ect resulted from employeesawareness of being observed more closely dur-
ing training. The Hawthorne e¤ect, named after the Hawthorne Western Electric Plant
in Illinois, alleges that any change is likely to bring about short-term gains in productiv-
ity. These gains in productivity may have been resulted because employees are receiving
attention, supervision, rest pauses or because of fear of losing their job (Franke and Kaul
1978). Hence, when the workers return to the ordinary schedule, with full workdays
and full workweeks, and without breaks or lunches, the productivity usually drops back
to the original level. Given that during training employees are receiving attention and
supervision, then according to the Hawthorne e¤ect, these factors are expected to a¤ect
positively productivity during this period. However, an alternative perspective claims
that the implementation of on-the-job training is not costless neither the productivity
is una¤ected. It often results to an opportunity cost of the trainer time and the lower
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output of the trainee due to the workers lack of familiarity with the job and the time
devoted to training (Bishop 1997). Testing the latter e¤ect is subject to di¢ culties since
the direct measurement of opportunity cost is not easy to quantify precisely. Here, it is
measured by estimating the productivity loss caused by training. In practice, the vari-
able on-the-job training has been split into two dummies denoted as during training (1=
during training and 0=otherwise) and after training (1= after training and 0=otherwise)
in order to observe how each variable impacts productivity.
Estimations in Table 4 reveal that during training no productivity enhancing e¤ect is
observed therefore the Hawthorne e¤ect explanation of the ndings is rejected. The coef-
cient of the during training variable is negative and marginally signicant for the whole
productivity and negative and highly signicant for the productivity of the small bread
sesame indicating that during the implementation of the training activity, there is a very
slight decrease in productivity. Thus, giving support to the opportunity cost argument.
In contrast, the coe¢ cient of after training shows that productivity is augmented by 7.3
percent. In addition, when I test the e¤ects of after training on the productivity of each
product separately, I nd positive and highly signicant results for all products with
exception of the small bread raisin which seems not statistically signicantly di¤erent
from zero.
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Table 4. Estimates of Ordinary Least Squares
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Variables Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b Model 5b
Log Log Log Log Log
Productivity Productivity Productivity Productivity Productivity
Small Bread Small Bread Small Bread Small Bread
Chocolate Raisin Roll Sesame
During Training -0.063* 0.047 0.014 -0.029 -0.231***
(0.034) (0.062) (0.065) (0.037) (0.078)
After Training 0.073*** 0.052** -0.001 0.064*** 0.102***
(0.015) (0.026) (0.027) (0.017) (0.035)
Log Production -0.674*** -0.779*** -0.780*** -0.946*** -0.235***
Time (0.026) (0.042) (0.048) (0.034) (0.067)
Small Bread -0.141***
Chocolate (0.019)
Small Bread -0.197***
Roll (0.019)
Small Bread -0.263***
Sesame (0.030)
Constant 4.528*** 4.685*** 4.870*** 5.092*** 2.639***
(0.076) (0.119) (0.137) (0.097) (0.243)
Observations 686 171 173 171 171
R2 0.830 0.685 0.613 0.840 0.162
AdjustedR2 0.829 0.680 0.606 0.837 0.146
*Statistically signicant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
Next, several control variables are added for production order aiming to observe
whether a particular order is more e¢ cient. Then, the amount of time between switching
from the production of one product to the other measured in minutes and denoted as
resting time is included. This variable is taken into consideration because the duration
of resting time might a¤ect employeesperformance given that an adequate resting time
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helps them to recharge and become more productive. Also, in an e¤ort to observe if there
is any temporal e¤ect, a working day variable is added (1=Monday and 6=Saturday),
denoted as day of the week. Finally, I try to capture the importance of other training
activities. In particular, production employees were also trained on re prevention and
building evacuation by the guidance of an outside trainer during the sample period. I
have included a control for this additional activity applied in the company, which is
unrelated to the workers main task and is denoted as during unrelated training.
Table 5, presents the estimates after entering gradually the controls. Adding these
variables collectively or separately yields essentially identical results. Model 6 includes
controls for the production order, and the ndings reveal that only the third one (denoted
as production order 3) is statistically signicant at the 95% condence interval. Model 7
adds the resting time variable which shows a positive and signicant coe¢ cient as well,
whereas Model 8 controls for the day of the week4 and its coe¢ cient turns out not di¤er-
ent from zero at a statistically signicant level. Model 9 adds during unrelated training,
the coe¢ cient of which is insignicant, suggesting that during unrelated training, there
is neither an increase nor a decrease in productivity. In Model 10 all control variables are
added simultaneously observing a further consistency of the results with very minor ex-
ceptions. Once controlling for these variables, the coe¢ cient of during training retains its
negative sign and the coe¢ cient of after training remains positive and highly signicant,
and thus proven consistent throughout the study.
4More models were estimated and the results demonstrate that the estimated coe¢ cients for the
variable measured in weeks and months are statistically insignicant.
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Table 5. Estimates of Ordinary Least Squares
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Variables Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Log Log Log Log Log
Productivity Productivity Productivity Productivity Productivity
During Training -0.063* -0.065* -0.062* -0.062* -0.063*
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
After Training 0.073*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.072***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Log Production -0.675*** -0.676*** -0.674*** -0.674*** -0.676***
Time (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
Small Bread -0.179*** -0.165*** -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.181***
Chocolate (0.027) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027)
Small Bread -0.284*** -0.189*** -0.197*** -0.197*** -0.272***
Roll (0.076) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.077)
Small Bread -0.357*** -0.257*** -0.263*** -0.263*** -0.352***
Sesame (0.080) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.080)
Production 0.103 0.100
Order 1 (0.077) (0.077)
Production 0.097 0.088
Order 2 (0.077) (0.077)
Production 0.055** 0.033
Order 3 (0.027) (0.032)
Resting Time 0.0002** 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Day of the -0.003 -0.003
Week (0.004) (0.004)
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Table 5 continued
Variables Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Log Log Log Log Log
Productivity Productivity Productivity Productivity Productivity
During Unrelated 0.031 0.032
Training (0.088) (0.087)
Constant 4.522*** 4.525*** 4.539*** 4.528*** 4.531***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) (0.077)
Observations 686 686 686 686 686
R2 0.831 0.831 0.830 0.830 0.832
AdjustedR2 0.829 0.829 0.828 0.828 0.829
*Statistically signicant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
2.4.3 Motivation vs. Coordination issues:
The e¤ect of on-the-job training on productivity might be di¤erent the shorter or the
longer the production time. This could be attributed to a number of factors. First,
when employees produce during a longer period of time, motivation issues become more
important. Usually, the e¢ ciency of the workers is diminishing gradually and their ability
of producing becomes less and less. This lies in the fact that when workers produce more,
they get tired faster and then it becomes more di¢ cult to stay focused on their work.
The implementation of training might be perceived as an opportunity to improve their
skills and might reect the companys enhanced attention to them which might a¤ect
positively their motivation. Increasing their motivation will help them into keeping up
with the routine of work and to be more alert during production. Second, in cases that
employees produce during a shorter period of time, coordination issues become more
important. When workers produce jointly, interacting and/or coordinating activities with
other members become crucial. At the beginning of the production process coordination
is harder but as time goes by they can keep the pace and orchestrate their activities. On-
the-job training is useful in helping them to integrate, synthesize, and cooperate more
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e¢ ciently with each other, and facilitates their understanding of the importance of each
individuals role.
In order to test these moderating e¤ects, during and after training variables are in-
teracted with production time. In model 11, the coe¢ cient of the interaction between
during training and production time is insignicant whereas the coe¢ cient of the in-
teraction between after training and production time is positive and highly signicant,
suggesting that training is more e¤ective the longer the production time. The result
implies that training contributes to motivating employees who might in return display
fewer disciplinary problems, and be more likely to stay engaged with their jobs which
could lead to productivity improvements. However, the coordination argument is not
supported. In Model 12, having added the controls, I obtain almost identical results
with a systematic positive and signicant e¤ect of the interaction between on-the-job
training and production time on productivity. It is worthwhile to note that the e¤ect of
training upon labor productivity that was positive and highly statistically signicant in
all models becomes negative and signicant, suggesting that it is the interaction between
training and production time that exerts a dominant inuence upon productivity rather
than training on its own.
Other results not reported here include regressions with more disaggregated control
variables and additional interactive terms. Instead of one dummy for the resting time
variable, I have created three separated dummies; one if resting time is up to 10 minutes,
one for resting time between 11 and 120 minutes (used as benchmark), and one for resting
time that exceeds that threshold, indicating that resting time of small duration is more
likely to be short breaks between productions whereas resting time of higher duration is
more likely to signify that employees are working on something else. Results show that
only the coe¢ cient of resting time up to 10 minutes is negative and marginally signicant
implying that when employees have short breaks, productivity is decreasing. However,
the variable loses signicance when I control for other factors. Finally, resting time is
interacted with the training variables, but none of the interactions is signicant.
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Table 6. Estimates of Ordinary Least Squares with Interactions
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Variables Model 11 Model 12
Log Productivity Log Productivity
During Training 0.049 0.045
(0.079) (0.079)
After Training -0.064** -0.063**
(0.030) (0.030)
Log Production Time -0.770*** -0.771***
(0.032) (0.032)
Small Bread Chocolate -0.142*** -0.182***
(0.018) (0.026)
Small Bread Roll -0.196*** -0.278***
(0.018) (0.075)
Small Bread Sesame -0.274*** -0.360***
(0.030) (0.078)
During Training  Production Time -0.005 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003)
After Training  Production Time 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
Production Order 1 0.097
(0.075)
Production Order 2 0.094
(0.075)
Production Order 3 0.042
(0.031)
Resting Time 0.000
(0.000)
Day of the Week -0.003
(0.004)
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Table 6 continued
Variables Model 11 Model 12
Log Productivity Log Productivity
During Unrelated Training 0.030
(0.085)
Constant 4.820*** 4.821***
(0.094) (0.095)
Observations 686 686
R2 0.840 0.840
AdjustedR2 0.837 0.837
*Statistically signicant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
2.5 Conclusions and Discussion
To sum up, the main predictions of the study show that the company obtains an almost
6.5 percent improvement in productivity by introducing on-the-job training as well as
a considerable increase in earnings per hour of production. Though, when the e¤ect of
on-the-job training on rm productivity is estimated separately for each product, the
output indicates that the impact is not signicant for all products. The most probable
explanation for the variation in the e¤ects can be attributed to the employeesability
to a¤ect more the productivity of products when there is more interaction among them
and less the productivity of products which require more automation. When testing the
di¤erential e¤ects of during and after training, estimates reject the Hawthorne e¤ect and
give support to the opportunity cost argument.
In contrast, after training seems to augment productivity by almost 7.3 percent. Also,
when testing for the di¤erential e¤ect of training the shorter or the longer the production
time, training does not seem to make a di¤erence when employees produce for a shorter
period of time, but it rather seems to be more e¤ective when production time is longer,
thus giving support to the motivation argument. The addition of the control variables
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shows that the training e¤ect remains unchanged, providing more credential to the main
results of the study.
The size of the e¤ect found is relatively large given that the training activity lasted
only few days and with very limited employer cost. Results though are very di¢ cult to
compare because research in the eld is very heterogeneous and there is an apparent vari-
ability in the datasets, training activities, productivity, and performance measures. Thus,
a word of caution is needed when paralleling results of previous studies. For instance,
Bartel (1994) found that the implementation of formal training improved productivity by
6% each year (between 1983 and 1986). Bartel (1995) showed that each day of training
increased employeeswages by 1.8 percent (wages were used as proxy for employee pro-
ductivity). Also, one of the interesting ndings of Barrett and OConnell (2001) revealed
that general training led to a 3.4 percent productivity growth while specic training had
no statistically signicant impact.
The study emphasizes that selecting the right data plays a very important factor in
this type of research and claims that focusing on the operations of a single rm can help
researchers evading important biases resulting from vague information on training, or
absence of actual productivity measures. It also shows that extracting daily data and
not snapshots of a rms situation provides the possibility to monitor the rm over some
time, and observe how changes in productivity can be related to the implementation
of on-the-job training. In addition, given that the study is focused on precise training
denitions and duration in days, as well as a very accurate productivity measure, it
can be claimed that there are not uncertainties as to whether the main results may be
driven by factors that was not possible to observe. Besides that, direct contact with the
production manager at the production site allowed investigating in depth whether there
are other reasons that could have a¤ected productivity. It also provided the possibility
to understand the motives that led the company to apply on-the-job training to other
types of training activities. In synopsis, the main explanation attained is that on-the-
job training causes a faster impact on productivity when the task is very simple and
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uncomplicated.
One major limitation stemming from this paper is that the ndings attained are
di¢ cult to generalize to other companies. Though, they can still provide guidance to
companies that have similar production processes and give an insight of the di¤erent
e¤ects of training when employees produce manually or use more automation, and for
shorter or longer production times. Despite the limitations and as other authors have
suggested (e.g. Bartel 2000), researchers should be encouraged to gain access to rms
records and collect information on variables necessary to isolate the e¤ect of training.
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Chapter 3
High Performance Work Practices,
Work Uncertainty, and Employee
Overtime. The Other Side of the
Story.
3.1 Introduction
Prior work has consistently demonstrated that the implementation of high performance
work practices (HPWP) such as participatory mechanisms, skill-based rewards, rota-
tion schemes, and training systems positively a¤ect labor productivity (Arthur 1994;
Koch and McGrath 1996; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997), nancial performance
(Huselid 1995; Huselid, Jackson, and Schuler 1997), or employee retention (Guthrie 2001).
Despite the consensus among scholars that these practices yield positive results, the em-
pirical examination of whether the benets come to employee at the expense of work
intensication is scarce. As it appears, HPWP increase e¤ectiveness by creating condi-
tions where employees become highly involved in the rm and work hard to achieve its
goals (Arthur, 1994; Wood and de Menezes 1998). However, one of the main problems
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in this research stream, and particularly in previous work on the impact on productiv-
ity, emanates from whether studies take into account the possible changes in employee
working time as a result of higher involvement and work e¤ort, when estimate the e¤ects
of human resource practices. In fact, the e¤ects might be overestimated if the impact of
HPWP on performance is tested without taking into consideration the increase in costs
due to overtime.
To reverse position, a small number of studies focus on this issue conjecturing that
HPWP have been a notable inuence on e¤ort or work intensication, with the terms
sometimes used interchangeably (Ramsay, Scholaries, and Harley 2000; Godard 2001;
Green 2004). Specically, their presumption is that the performance gains from human
resources practices might arise from work intensication which may manifest itself mainly
in two di¤erent dimensions; either by employees exerting greater work e¤ort during a
given period of time or by employees staying longer hours at work. However, empirically
basic hypothesis concerning the implications for the latter has generally not been tested.
As it appears, there is scarcity of data availability on e¤ort and much of the measures on
work intensication are in a subjective form of work e¤ort, while spending longer hours
at work as a more objective measure has been highly neglected.
Aiming at lling this gap, the study draws on the perspective which focuses on how
HPWP are related to work intensication in the form of longer working hours. A positive
relationship is hypothesized. This is not an obvious issue because there is the alterna-
tive perspective which emphasizes the capacity of HPWP to prepare employees to work
more e¢ ciently, and thus suggests the opposite relationship. It is also important to
understand that there are other signicant factors contributing to work intensication.
Among them, previous literature suggests that work intensication is the consequence of
exogenous changes that reect disruptions or uncertainty (Godard 2001). Thus, the study
estimates that uncertainty at work could be also driving some of the employee overtime,
and takes a step further arguing that this positive relationship could be mediated by the
implementation of HPWP. The reasoning behind this hypothesis lies on previous theo-
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retical work which has highlighted the capacity of human resource practices to facilitate
a rms ability to adapt e¤ectively to changing demands, from either the environment
or from within the rm itself (Milliman, Von Glinow, and Nathan 1991; Snow and Snell
1993; MacDu¢ e 1995). According to that perspective, when there is uncertainty, intro-
ducing various HPWP helps employees to become more exible in the organization of
work and better acclimatize to uncertain and dynamic environments. These arguments
point out the importance of examining the mediating role of these practices, and thus
the nal step tests how exactly these transmit the e¤ects of uncertainty to employee
overtime.
In essence, the current approach departs from previous literature mainly in the fol-
lowing aspects. First, it attempts to determine whether HPWP are related to employee
overtime as an objective measure of work intensication. This is an important contri-
bution for two reasons. First, working longer hours at work might be driven by the
introduction of HPWP, however prior work has given scant attention. Second, overtime
as a measure of work intensication has not been studied in this context. Finally, the pa-
per produces an integrative multiple mediation model which advances previous literature
by addressing how di¤erent HPWP may transmit the e¤ects of uncertainty on employee
overtime. If it is accepted that this has been an era of work intensication, then a better
knowledge of possible sources of work intensication contribute to our knowledge of this
phenomenon.
Hypotheses are tested using the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) of
2005. This survey aims at providing an analysis of working conditions of nearly 30,000
individual workers in thirty one European countries. This is an important context to
study the relationships of interest because many European rms have started introduc-
ing HPWP, in a moment where a rise in the work intensity gures has been noticed
(Green 2001; Green and McIntosh 2001; Green 2004), and employee overtime remains a
signicant issue across Europe (EIRO 2003).
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3.2 Previous Research
Three streams of literature are relevant to this study: the human resource management
literature on high-performance work practices, the literature on overtime, and the work
intensication literature.
Papers on the former literature focus extensively on the impact of human resource
practices on di¤erent performance outcomes. However, the majority of them do not have
su¢ cient data to account for possible changes in employee working time resulted from
the introduction of such practices and in particular, measures of productivity often do
not account for hours worked. For example, Huselid (1995) examines the link between
human resource practices and various employee outcomes such as employee turnover,
productivity, and short-term and long-term measures of corporate nancial performance.
He measures turnover with the average annual rate of turnover, rm productivity with
the logarithm of sales per employee, nancial performance with the logarithm of Tobins
q, and the gross rate of return on capital. Koch and McGrath (1996) study the e¤ects of
human resource planning, recruitment, and selection strategies on labor productivity. In
this case, productivity is measured by dividing the business units net sales by the number
of employees, thus comparing the input of labor to the output of sales. Black and Lynch
(1996) examine the impact of human capital investments, including age and certain types
of employer-provided training, on business productivity proxied by the dollar value of
sales. Black and Lynch (2001) show how workplace practices, and information technology
a¤ect productivity levels measured by the sales per production worker. Guthrie (2001)
tests how the use of such practices impacts both rm productivity and employee retention.
Labor productivity is the logarithm of sales per employee, and employee retention is
measured as the rms average annual rate of employee turnover. There are, however, few
exceptions which directly or indirectly take into consideration working time. MacDu¢ e
(1995) studies the e¤ect of a system of human resource practices on labor productivity.
Labor productivity is dened as the number of hours of working e¤ort required to build a
production unit (a vehicle). Also, the studies of Ichniowski et al. (1997) and Ichniowski
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and Shaw (1999) investigate the productivity e¤ects of various practices such as incentive
pay, teams, and training, and measure productivity with uptime claiming that increases
in uptime are increases in tonnage and productivity.
Papers on the overtime literature identify key drivers of overtime by looking mainly
at wages, unionization, employee absenteeism, or di¤erences in employee skills. However,
human resource practices could be also associated with the overtime incidence, yet they
are ignored. For instance, Ehrenberg (1970) argues that absenteeism is one of the causes
that could increase the amount of overtime worked per employee. Bauer and Zimmer-
mann (1999) suggest that the employee skill levels and output growth play an important
role on overtime, whereas compensation for overtime has become less relevant. Doerr,
Klastorin, and Magazine (2000) infer that overtime is of signicance when manufacturing
to a quota, and point out that when working times are highly variable, overtime is a bet-
ter alternative than hiring additional workers. Finally, the paper by Kalwij, and Gregory
(2005) suggests that a reduction in standard weekly hours increases overtime work, an
increase in the wage rate decreases the incidence of overtime, and union coverage appears
to be of negligible importance.
Finally, studies on the work intensication identify that human resource practices are
important sources of work intensication. Nevertheless, they focus almost exclusively on
the subjective nature of the e¤ort-intensication data or use proxies for work e¤ort. Such
measures include the extent to which job involves working at high speed or a great deal
of tension (Green 2004) as well the extent of workload and work stressfulness (Godard
2001). Papers in this stream of literature include Ramsay et al. (2000) who study the
relationship of an inclusive set of twenty four human resource practices (e.g. performance
related pay, training, recruitment and selection, teamwork), and a number of intermedi-
ate outcomes including the intensication at work and job strain which act as mediators
of various performance outcomes. In their paper, work intensication is dened as sub-
jective management reports of the observed change in labor productivity, while job strain
is dened as the perception of not having enough time to get the job done or as being
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worried about work outside working hours. Their ndings suggest that in work environ-
ments where these practices have been applied, management does perceive increased work
intensication and job strain. Similarly, the work of Godard (2001) examines the positive
and the negative implications of the adoption of human resource practices inferring that
one of the negative employee outcomes is work intensication. Here, work intensication
is dened as workload and work stressfulness. His results suggest that human resource
practices appear to be associated only with the work stressfulness measure of work in-
tensication. The study of Green (2004) also hypothesizes that work intensication has
been stimulated, among others, by the implementation of human resource practices. In
particular, he proposes that employee involvement schemes and e¤ort incentives appear
to engender work intensication. Again, work intensication is measured through subjec-
tive reports on a survey question about changes in workplace regarding how hard people
work at their job.
In summary, although there has been considerable research assessing the implication
of human resources practices on di¤erent outcomes, previous studies in this line of re-
search have largely ignored the importance of changes in working time caused by the
introduction of such practices. In addition, the high performance thesis underpinning
the benets of the adoption of these practices has been developed at a time work has
been severely intensied. This has meant that scholars were encouraged to search alter-
native trajectories through which human resource practices could be studied. However,
previous research on the work intensication literature has only recently begun to address
the implications of human resource practices to work intensication and to a large extent
has mostly relied on the subjective nature of the e¤ort-intensication data; while, the
incidence of overtime is not studied in this context.
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3.3 Hypotheses
I examine two theoretical approaches, work e¢ ciency vs. work intensication. One
focuses on the relationship between HPWP and employee e¢ ciency, whereas the other is
paying attention to the link between these practices and employee overtime.
The literature on human resource practices argues that employees are introduced to
various techniques concerning training, teamwork, job design, and many others aiming
at eliciting optimal performance. There is ample evidence which shows strong support
for the conclusion that these practices are indeed a cause of improved performance, and
that is why the literature often refers to them as HPWP (Huselid, 1995; Delaney and
Huselid 1996; Guest 1997). HPWP are designed to stimulate greater involvement and
commitment in the rm (Snell and Dean 1992; MacDu¢ e 1995; Youndt et al. 1996;
Ichniowski et al. 1997). It is either explicit or implicit that greater commitment induces
workers to increase work e¤ort and encourages them to identify with the goals of the orga-
nization and work hard to accomplish them (Arthur 1994; Wood and de Menezes 1998).
According to this perspective, high-e¤ort actions helps them to work somehow smarter
by getting them to work actively which will eventually lead to increased e¢ ciencies in
processes and rm productivity.
For example, training is considered a very powerful mechanism that engenders a pro-
ductivity enhancing response from the employee (Bartel 1994; 1995; Bartel, Ichniowski,
and Shaw 2004), and job rotation develops abilities and directs employees e¤orts in
meeting production needs in case of reallocation across di¤erent tasks (Eriksson and Or-
tega 2006). Economic incentives and jobs with performance-related pay induce workers
to exert greater e¤ort and achieve substantial gains in productivity because in return
they expect their e¤orts to be fairly rewarded (Ichniowski 1986; Ichniowski et al. 1997).
Furthermore, teamwork is expected to increase production possibilities by using collab-
orative skills and information sharing that aid in transferring idiosyncratic knowledge
from one team member to another (Lazear 1998; Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan 2003).
Also, there is growing evidence supporting that employee participation not only enhances
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individual knowledge but also increases e¤ort which subsequently improves e¢ ciency
and productivity, reduces the cost of monitoring employees and leads to increased com-
mitment (Doucouliagos, 1995) and improved rm performance (Osterman 1995; Ortega
2009a).
However, creating conditions where employees have to be more involved in their job
and work harder to achieve certain goals sometimes might cause adverse results (Ramsay
et al. 2000; Green 2004). There are perceptions suggesting that although the implemen-
tation of HPWP leads to work e¢ ciency, it may also have negative consequences, partic-
ularly on the quality of employee working life. Previous research assesses the implications
of these practices on negative experiences at work such as greater tension, insu¢ cient
time to perform tasks, and missed deadlines (see more in Godard 2001; White et al.
2003). However, there is limited insight into the implications of HPWP on extra-work
outcomes. The practices might increase the number of additional hours worked in order
to reach expected outcomes. Thus, it seems plausible that these practices are driving
employee overtime to the extent that they are designed to evince greater e¤ort and in-
volvement in pursuit of the organizations goals. Scholarsdiscussions directly address
the issue of increased e¤ort or harder work but do not directly review employer practices
that exert pressure to work longer hours and end up in working overtime; though it is
natural to inquire that this might be the case.
For example, training schemes could boost employee overtime due to the time employ-
ees have to spend in learning as opposed to those engaged in actual production (Carrillo
and Gaimon 2004). Similarly, the benets attributed to rotation schemes come at a
cost of increased workload levels (Campion, Cheraskins and Stevens 1994). This is the
case because employees might need considerable adaptation time to perform well in new
assignments or adjust to the job requirements of each rotated position. Incentive pay
seems also to be associated with longer hours at work mainly because it a¤ects work
e¤ort hours and those who work hard might be rewarded with a pay increase (Bell and
Freeman 2001). Also, employee discretion can aggravate employee overtime because it
43
designates less assistance at work and more individual responsibility. For instance, higher
employee participation often implies greater involvement of non-managerial employees in
decisions previously left to the discretion of managers (Gittleman, Horrigan, and Joyce
1998). This shift in responsibility despite of causing productivity gains could also involve
an o­ oading of tasks leading to employee overtime.
HPWP are likely to have a larger e¤ect on performance when implemented syner-
gistically rather than in a vacuum because they can interact to reinforce one another
(MacDu¢ e 1995; Huselid 1995; Ichniowski et al. 1996; Becker and Huselid 1998; Wood
1999; Ichniowski and Shaw 1999). For instance, the returns from the use of internal
selection procedures are likely to be greater when a rm applies a performance appraisal
system and an incentive plan to reward high performing employees. Also, a strong in-
centive system to retain employees in the rm can magnify the results from investments
in employee training. The benets stemming from the adoption of bundles again are
residing to the creation of the appropriate circumstances where employees become more
involved in the organization (Arthur, 1994; Wood and de Menezes, 1998; Whitener 2001);
such as by participating in managerial decisions, while getting involved with developmen-
tal programs and incentive plans. Though, as a result of higher involvement, bundles
could lead directly or indirectly to work intensication conjecturing that HPWP jointly
adopted may actually be linked to performance through work intensication. In fact,
previous work has found that bundles of practices are associated with increased e¤ort
such as job strain, o¤-loading of tasks, and work intensication as a potential explana-
tory for negative experience (Ramsay et al. 2000) as well as harder work (Ichniowski
and Shaw 2003). Thus, we might well expect their combined e¤ects to further amplify
their association to employee overtime at higher levels of adoption. In short, if employees
have to be ready to solve problems promptly while participating continuously in deci-
sion making, or attending training and development programs, then they might have to
exert more e¤ort that could take the form of extra working time as a result of higher
involvement, added responsibility, and higher job demands. Taking these arguments into
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account, then it is expected:
Hypothesis 1a. Individual high performance work practices will be posi-
tively related to employee overtime.
Hypothesis 1b. The positive relationship of high performance work prac-
tices and employee overtime will be stronger when practices are adopted in
combination.
Theoretical work suggests that work intensication could be the outcome of process
changes through the addition of new technologies, organizational changes (Green 2004)
and increased competitive pressures being passed on to workers (Burchell et al. 1999).
Some of these changes tend to increase the plants e¤ective capacity, such as by reducing
setup times as a driver of rm performance (Spence and Porteus 1987). But mainly they
tend to raise work e¤ort because they seem to be associated with greater managerial con-
trol over the labour process which is likely to bring higher e¤ort levels (Green 2004). At
the same time, these factors are characterized by a great level of uncertainty. Frequently,
technological change are accompanied by technical problems which lead to production
disruptions or excessive idle time, the result of which might be smaller-than-expected gain
in the plants e¤ective capacity which can reduce ultimate performance gains. In such
cases, costly measures are needed in order to increase performance such as expediting or
overtime (Pisano 1996; Cohen and Apte 1997; Davenport 1998). Second, uncertainty is
associated with competitive pressures as well because these mechanisms might lead to
abrupt and unexpected increases in demand. Overtime work, then, appears as a mecha-
nism to adjust the rms capacity to production requirements. The incidence of overtime
can increase a rms capacity directly in an e¤ort to cover increased production require-
ments by increasing the number of hours worked (Spence and Porteus 1987). Another
source of uncertainty derived from these forces involves scheduling changes introduced
in order to avoid bottleneck workstation problems (Pisano 1996; Cohen and Apte 1997;
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Davenport 1998). Scheduling changes inevitably involve a certain level of uncertainty
which might raise the potential of work done outside normal working hours. Thus, it
is expected that work uncertainty resulting from di¤erent types of changes is positive
related to employee overtime. Stated formally:
Hypothesis 2. Work uncertainty will be positively related to employee over-
time.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 o¤er insight into two alternative drivers of employee overtime.
The e¤ect of each of these two factors, however, cannot be fully understood in isolation
from the other. An important part of the overtime story concerns the fact that employees
are introduced to HPWP possibly with the objective of creating a more positive environ-
ment and help employees coping with uncertainty at work. As previous work suggests,
HPWP improve employee skills, and are expected to prepare employees to deal better
with technical problems or to confront changes at work when they arise. In particular,
investing in worker knowledge such as by engaging employees in training has been claimed
to attenuate some of the outcome uncertainty of process change and further enhance the
magnitude of gain in performance (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Adler and Clark 1991;
Pisano 1996; Schroeder, Bates, and Junttila 2002; Carrillo and Gaimon 2004).
Although previous work explicitly recognizes the importance of these practices in
coping with uncertainty in an e¤ort to achieve performance gains, it has not examined
the consequences of introducing HPWP in terms of amplifying overtime work. Following
the arguments stated in hypothesis 1, and taking into account that HPWP are frequently
introduced as a response to uncertainty, it is then expected that they will act as mediating
mechanisms between uncertainty and employee overtime. More explicitly, as discussed
previously, uncertainty is associated with employee overtime, and HPWP can be used in
order to mitigate the negative consequences of uncertainty but usually on performance. In
contrast, in this study, I have argued that HPWP may amplify the relationship between
uncertainty and overtime because they are very likely to be related to overtime as well.
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Therefore, I expect that one way uncertainty is related to employee overtime is through
these practices, and due to their own independent relationship to overtime, I suggest a
partial mediated model. Accordingly:
Hypothesis 3. HPWP will partially mediate the positive relationship be-
tween work uncertainty and employee overtime.
3.4 Data and Measures
The main source of data is the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) carried
out in 2005 by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions. The survey is designed to present a detailed analysis of various aspects of
working life across the European Union, the two candidate countries Turkey and Croatia,
as well as Switzerland and Norway, and provide insights into emerging themes and specic
practices applied. It is based on self-reports of nearly 30,000 individual workers, however
since the paper studies HPWP such as teamwork and rotation, self-employed individuals
had to be excluded.
Unlike previous literature which has focused on subjective measures of work intensi-
cation, here it is elaborated a more objective measure as a dependent variable, dened as
overtime. This is a count variable assessed using a question that asks how many times a
month does an employee work more than 10 hours a day. For the majority of individuals
this is zero, but for the remainder values typically reach as many as thirty with some
observations reaching thirty one (see Table 1 for denitions and Table 2 for summary
statistics). Regarding HPWP, according to the literature, conceptually they can be clas-
sied in terms of their impact on employeesskills, motivation, and the way the work is
structured (Huselid 1995; MacDu¢ e 1995; Delaney and Huselid 1996). The questionnaire
contains very detailed information pertaining to each category out of which seven main
explanatory variables have been constructed; training, task rotation, productivity pay,
gain sharing, teamwork, employee discretion over methods, and employee discretion over
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schedule. All of them measure the respondents participation in each practice, rather
than the frequency of those practices at the organizational level.
Training and task rotation refer to employee skills. The former is constructed out
of four di¤erent types of training = (training paid by the employer + training paid by
the employee + on-the-job training + other forms of training)/4. The latter is examined
by using a dichotomous (yes/no) question that asks if an employees job involves rotat-
ing tasks between himself/herself and colleagues. The next two variables, productivity
pay and gain sharing refer to employee motivation. Both are measured dichotomously
with questions that ask whether employee remuneration includes payments based on the
overall performance, and whether he/she receives productivity piece rate or productivity
payments. Further, teamwork and the employee discretion variables refer to the structure
of work. Teamwork is measured dichotomously and depicts whether an employees job
involves doing all or part of his/her work in a team. The rst type of discretion is based
on three items referring to employee autonomy to choose or change the order of tasks, the
method of work, and the speed or rate of work and is dened as discretion over methods
= (task order + work methods + work speed)/3. Similarly is evaluated the second type
of discretion dened as discretion over schedule and focuses on three items referring to
employee autonomy to choose breaks, decide when to take holidays, and choose among
di¤erent working time arrangements (see more in Ortega 2009b).
In order to test hypothesis 1b, I have created a bundle out of the aforementioned
practices. Here, training is operated via four items, and discretion mechanisms via the
six discretion practices, and along with task rotation, productivity pay, gain sharing, and
teamwork give a total of fourteen practices bundled together. To measure it, I use the
additive approach following MacDu¢ e (1995) which allows for a less restrictive bundling
of human resource practices. MacDu¢ e suggests that the summation in the additive
approach keeps normal distribution and it is a less rigid criterion for a bundle than the
multiplicative approach, especially when a certain practice does not exist. All items
have been standardized to have a 0 mean and a standard deviation equal to 1 before I
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construct the indexes1.
The work uncertainty can be expressed along di¤erent dimensions. For the purpose
of this paper, the focus has been placed on task interruptions and changes on employees
schedule. The rst item, dened as task uncertainty, measures how often does an em-
ployee have to interrupt a task he/she is doing in order to take on an unforeseen task,
and is expressed at a 4-point scale (never, 0, to yes, very often, 3). The second item,
dened as schedule uncertainty, measures whether changes in schedule occur regularly
and if yes, how long before the employee is informed about the changes. Responses for
this item have a 5-point response format (no, 0, to yes, the same day, 4). Given that
there is no direct measure in the survey to account for shifts in supply, the latter variable
could also serve as a proxy, inferring that schedule modications are usually taking place
when an employee has to work more hours rather than less hours in an e¤ort to meet
unexpected job demands.
To capture individual, rm, and contextual factors that might be related to both the
implementation of HPWP, performance, and employee overtime, I have taken into consid-
eration several control variables. Drawing on prior research, I initially control for gender
di¤erences because the increase in e¤ort has been somewhat greater for women than men
(Green 2004). Then, I control for age as a proxy for work experience (Dokko, Wilk, and
Rothbard 2009), tenure as a proxy for ability (Ortega 2009a), and the educational level
of employees as a proxy for learning ability (Cappelli 2004). I also employ controls for
work status (full-time or part-time) and the type of employment contract, since both are
likely to a¤ect e¤ort levels and subsequently performance. For example, employees in a
temporary position might devote extra e¤ort if they aim to be reemployed in preceding
periods. The opposite reaction is also plausible since the employee temporary condition
1For training, discretion over methods, discretion over schedule and bundle, Cronbachs alpha are
0.56, 0.75, 0.62, and 0.66 respectively. I also use other constructs to measure each index. The former
variable takes 1 in case of having received any of the four training activities and 0 otherwise. Discretion
over methods takes 1 in case of employees having autonomy in any of the 3 practices and 0 otherwise. In
the same way is constructed the discretion over schedule index. And the alternative constructed index
for the bundle measures whether employees are involved in any 5 out of the seven individual HPWP.
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might generate demoralization and might reduce incentives and their willingness to invest
e¤ort at work (Green 2004). I include controls for the number of employees under each
employees supervision, and employee occupation which are also expected to have some
association with employee e¤ort (Green and McIntosh 2001). Firm size is very important
as well because larger rms may be more likely to adopt HPWP (Osterman 1994; Git-
tleman et al. 1998), and therefore I control for it. I also add controls for sector because
previous research claims that public sector has experienced greater e¤ort intensication
than the private sector (Green 2004). Finally, I add a number of controls for industry
representing two-digit Standard Industrial Classication (SIC), and countries in order to
capture any other industry and contextual characteristics associated with performance
perceptions.
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Table 1. Denitions of Variables
Variables Questions and denitions
Overtime How many times a month do you work more than 10
hours a day?
Training Have you undergone: training paid for or provided by
your employer or by yourself if you are self-employed?
-training paid for by yourself?
-on-the-job training (co-workers, supervisors)?
-other forms of on-site training and learning (e.g.
self-learning, on-line, tutorials etc)?
Task rotation Does your job involve rotating tasks between yourself and
colleagues?
Productivity pay Does your remuneration include piece rate or productivity
payments?
Gain sharing Does your remuneration include payments based on the
overall performance of the company (prot sharing scheme)
where you work?
Teamwork Does your job involve doing all or part of your work in a team?
Discretion over methods Are you able, or not, to choose or change your order of tasks?
-your methods of work?
-your speed or rate of work?
Discretion over schedule Can you take your break when you wish?
-are you free to decide when to take holidays or days o¤?
-how are your working time arrangements set?
Task uncertainty How often do you have to interrupt a task you are doing in
order to take on an unforseen task?
Schedule uncertainty Do changes to your work schedule occur regularly? (IF YES)
How long before are you informed about these changes?
Male Gender
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Table 1 continued
Age Years of age
Tenure How many years have you been in your company or
organization? If less than a year, how many months?
Education What is the highest level of education or training that
you have successfully completed? One digit ISCED code
Fulltime Work status
Contract What kind of employment contract do you have
(indenite contract, xed term contract, temporary
employment agency contract, apprenticeship or other
training scheme, no contract or other)?
Supervision How many people work under your supervision, for
whom pay increases, bonuses or promotion depend
directly on you?
Occupation One-digit ISCO-88 occupation
Firm size How many people in total work in the local unit of the
establishment where you work?
Public Sector
Industry One-digit NACE industry
Country Country of interview
Scales: Overtime is 0-31, task uncertainty is 0-3, schedule uncertainty is 0-4, age, tenure
ure, education, supervision are continues, rm size is 0 = 2-4 individuals, 1 = 5-9, 2 = 10-
49, 3 = 50-99, 4 =100-249, 5 = 250-499, 6 = 500 and over (interviewee works alone is
excluded from the sample). For all othervariables the scale is 0 = no, 1 = yes.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
Variables N Mean Std. Dev Min Max
1. Overtime 24,853 2.818 5.818 0 31
2. Training by employer 25,573 0.306 0.461 0 1
3. Training by employee 25,572 0.069 0.253 0 1
4. On-the-job training 25,545 0.322 0.467 0 1
5. Other forms of training 25,526 0.215 0.411 0 1
6. Task rotation 25,435 0.501 0.500 0 1
7. Productivity pay 22,723 0.120 0.325 0 1
8. Gain sharing 22,630 0.086 0.280 0 1
9. Teamwork 25,441 0.648 0.478 0 1
10. Task order 25,479 0.640 0.480 0 1
11. Work methods 25,457 0.668 0.471 0 1
12. Work speed 25,386 0.703 0.457 0 1
13. Breaks 25,458 2.039 1.580 0 4
14. Days o¤ 25,259 2.161 1.548 0 4
15. Time arrangements 25,519 0.756 1.091 0 3
16. Task uncertainty 25,491 1.270 0.984 0 3
17. Schedule uncertainty 17,880 0.771 1.334 0 4
3.5 Resutls
Before presenting the results of the estimation of equations, I report in Table 3 correla-
tions on the sample of employees. The correlation coe¢ cients give a rst impression of
the hypothesized relationships between the regressors and the regresand. All are posi-
tively related to overtime, while employer training, on-the-job training, and days o¤ do
not seem to be related to it.
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Table 3. Correlations
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Overtime 1.00
2. Training by employer 0.01 1.00
3. Training by employee 0.05* 0.12* 1.00
4. On-the-job training -0.003 0.36* 0.07* 1.00
5. Other forms of training 0.03* 0.27* 0.15* 0.38* 1.00
6. Task rotation 0.04* 0.10* 0.02* 0.12* 0.07* 1.00
7. Productivity pay 0.06* -0.03* -0.02* 0.01 -0.02* 0.002 1.00
8. Gain sharing 0.05* 0.10* -0.01 0.09* 0.08* 0.04* 0.10* 1.00
9. Teamwork 0.05* 0.12* 0.03* 0.15* 0.10* 0.37* 0.02* 0.05* 1.00
10. Task order 0.04* 0.14* 0.07* 0.06* 0.12* 0.02* -0.07* 0.06* 0.01
11. Work methods 0.05* 0.13* 0.07* 0.06* 0.12* 0.02* -0.05* 0.05* 0.02*
12. Work speed 0.04* 0.07* 0.05* 0.02* 0.08* 0.02* -0.01 0.04* -0.00
13. Breaks 0.07* 0.07* 0.01* 0.01 0.05* -0.04* -0.01 0.11* -0.04*
14. Days o¤ -0.01 0.08* 0.003 0.04* 0.04* 0.01 -0.02* 0.10* 0.01
15. Time arrangements 0.19* 0.08* 0.05* 0.01* 0.06* -0.02* 0.00 0.13* -0.03*
16. Task uncertainty 0.07* 0.18* 0.04* 0.13* 0.12* 0.17* -0.06* 0.06* 0.15*
17. Schedule uncertainty 0.15* 0.03* 0.02* 0.06* 0.02* 0.10* 0.07* 0.02* 0.07*
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
10. Task order 1.00
11. Work methods 0.56* 1.00
12. Work speed 0.45* 0.48* 1.00
13. Breaks 0.34* 0.26* 0.28* 1.00
14. Days o¤ 0.20* 0.14* 0.16* 0.41* 1.00
15. Time arrangements 0.29* 0.25* 0.20* 0.39* 0.29* 1.00
16. Task uncertainty 0.19* 0.16* 0.07* 0.11* 0.06* 0.13 1.00
17. Schedule uncertainty -0.04 -0.02* -0.04* -0.04* -0.07* 0.10 0.11 1.00
* p< 0.05
As a next step, I conduct preliminary analysis in order to assess the di¤erence in
approaches to overdisperion observed in the count outcome variable with a mean much
lower than the variance (=2.818, var= 33.846), without considering any covariates.
Ordinary Poisson regression underestimates the standard errors therefore alternatively
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I use a negative binomial regression for modeling the overdispersion. The dependent
variable is the count of overtime, yi which depends on observed Xik and unobserved ui
variables. Considering that count variable, yi has a negative binomial distribution, then
I specify the model as such:
yi  Negbin(i;2y); i = 1; 2; : : : ; n (3.1)
log i =
KX
k=1
kXik + ui; k = 1; 2; :::; K
where i = E fyijxig ;2y = V ar fyijxig ; Xik is n K dimensional matrix, indicat-
ing the number of independent variables (training, task rotation, productivity pay, gain
sharing, teamwork, discretion over methods, discretion over schedule). The controls are
introduced into all regressions in order to take into account the possible heterogeneity
attached to individual and rm characteristics that might be related to overtime, apart
from its association with the main explanatory variables.
Table 4 presents the overall results by introducing gradually the main explanatory
variables of the study. Model 1 contains the individual HPWP and indicates that coe¢ -
cients are positive and signicant in most of them. Particularly, training, task rotation,
productivity pay, and teamwork seem to be positively and highly signicantly related
to overtime, while gain sharing, discretion over methods and schedule although positive
do not seem to di¤er from zero at a statistical signicant level. Thus, lending evidence
to hypothesis 1a which supports that individual HPWP will be positively associated
with employee overtime. Model 2 tests the potential association between complementary
HPWP and overtime. Here, the human resource (HR) bundle and the HR bundle2 enter
into the regression. The individual practices had to be excluded because of multicollinear-
ity problems2. The coe¢ cients turn out to be positive and highly signicant, yielding
support for Hypothesis 1b which predicts that the positive relationship of HPWP and
2I re-estimated the equation but substituted the bundle with the individual HPWP. The association
of the dependent variable with the training, task rotation, productivity pay, teamwork and the bundle8
appear to be signicantly positive.
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employee overtime will be stronger when practices are adopted in combination.
Moving forward with the analysis, I examine the relationship between work uncer-
tainty and employee overtime, and the multiple mediating role of the HPWP. In order
to test the mediation, I use the procedure proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) which
mainly involves three regression equations. Mediation requires the existence of a direct
e¤ect to be mediated. Therefore, the rst step of the mediation involves regressing em-
ployee overtime on work uncertainty and the control variables. Rather than performing a
separate regression analysis for each type of uncertainty, I simultaneously enter variables
in a single equation in order to correct for any multicollinearity among them. The results
in Model 3 conrm both relationships. Task uncertainty and schedule uncertainty proved
to be positively and signicantly related to overtime ( = 0.148, p < 0.01;  = 0.217, p
< 0.01), thus providing support for hypothesis 2.
Further, the mediation hypothesis implies that work uncertainty is related to the
HPWP. In forwarding our mediation hypothesis, I regress each of the HPWP, individu-
ally and as a bundle, and the control variables on each type of uncertainty. The results
indicate that the majority of the coe¢ cients are positive and signicant. However, the
relationship between task uncertainty and productivity pay, task uncertainty and the HR
bundle2, and schedule uncertainty and both discretion mechanisms proved to have the
opposite signs (see more in Table 5). The next step presumes a positive relation between
HPWP and employee overtime which has already been tested in the rst model. Finally,
employee overtime is regressed on both types of uncertainty, HPWP, and the control
variables. When comparing models 3 and 4 (Table 4) results indicate that the signi-
cant relationship found between work uncertainty and overtime remains signicant, but
the coe¢ cients are smaller in magnitude when practices enter into the equation. At the
same time, the coe¢ cients of the HPWP remain signicant for some of the variables with
the exception of productivity pay where the coe¢ cient becomes totally insignicant. The
correlations, and the results in Model 1 suggest that productivity pay is positively associ-
ated with employee overtime (r= 0.057, p < 0.05), ( = 0.235, p < 0.01), however Model
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4 shows that this relationship is, in fact, nonsignicant when other HPWP, work uncer-
tainty, and the control variables are controlled for ( = 0.029, n.s.). Other interesting
results include the coe¢ cient of discretion over schedule which becomes signicant, and
with a negative sign. Next, in Model 5, employee overtime is regressed on the HR bundle,
the HR bundle2, the work uncertainty variables, and the controls. Again, the signicant
relationship found between task uncertainty and overtime becomes smaller in magnitude
when the bundle enters into the equation; however the coe¢ cient of schedule uncertainty
becomes bigger. At the same time, the HR bundle remains signicant, however, the HR
bundle2 becomes insignicant, suggesting no clear support for their mediating role.
Previous researchers suggest that if the reduction is somehow marginal, then the ad-
dition of a mediator variable is not the most parsimonious model. To correct for this
problem, I use the procedure for testing of mediated e¤ects outlined by Baron and Kenny
(1986). In particular, I conducted a Sobel-Goodman test to determine the signicance of
the mediated e¤ect of work uncertainty on employee overtime via HPWP. The purpose
of the Sobel-Goodman test is to assess whether a mediator carries the inuence of an
independent to a dependent variable, and it works well only in large samples. Performing
the test, I nd that the mediation e¤ect of training is statistically signicant with almost
4% of the total e¤ect of task uncertainty on overtime being mediated and 2% of the
total e¤ect of schedule uncertainty on overtime being mediated. The mediation e¤ect
of task rotation is statistically signicant with 7% of the rst total e¤ect and 3% of the
second total e¤ect being mediated. However, the mediation e¤ect of productivity pay is
negative and statistically signicant with 6% of the total e¤ect of task uncertainty on
overtime being mediated and positive with 2% of the total e¤ect of schedule uncertainty
on overtime being mediated. In addition, the mediation e¤ect of gain sharing is statisti-
cally signicant with 5% of the rst total e¤ect and 0.4% of the second total e¤ect being
mediated. Also, the mediation e¤ect of teamwork is statistically signicant with 8% of
the rst total e¤ect and 3% of the second total e¤ect being mediated. The mediation
e¤ect of discretion over methods is statistically signicant with 9% of the total e¤ect
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of task uncertainty on overtime being mediated, while the mediation e¤ect of schedule
uncertainty is not signicant. Then, the mediation e¤ect of discretion over schedule is
statistically signicant with 2% of the total e¤ect of task uncertainty on overtime and
0.1% of the total e¤ect of schedule uncertainty on overtime being mediated. The media-
tion e¤ect of the HR bundle is statistically signicant with approximately 26% of the total
e¤ect of task uncertainty on overtime being mediated and with approximately 1% of the
total e¤ect of schedule uncertainty on overtime being mediated. Finally, the mediation
e¤ect of the HR bundle2 is signicant with 0.9% of the total e¤ect of task uncertainty on
overtime being mediated, while the mediation e¤ect of schedule uncertainty on overtime
is not signicant.
I also used bootstrapping following Preacher and Hayes (2004). The results further
conrm the mediating e¤ects of training (z= 2.42, p<0.05; z= 4.54, p<0.01), task rota-
tion (z= 4.89, p<0.01; z= 5.91, p<0.01), productivity pay (z= -6.05, p<0.01; z= 3.75,
p<0.01), gain sharing (z= 5.32, p<0.01; z= 1.75, p<0.1), teamwork (z= 6.05 , p<0.01;
z= 5.95 , p<0.01), discretion over schedule (z= 11.11, p<0.01); (z= 3.10, p<0.01), and
the HR bundle (z= 8.53, p<0.01; z= 3.15, p<0.01). All are signicant for the rela-
tionship between task uncertainty and overtime, and schedule uncertainty and overtime
respectively. In contrast, discretion over methods (z= 6.24, p<0.01) is signicant only
for the relationship between task uncertainty and overtime while the HR bundle2 is not
signicant for none of the relationships. These ndings suggest that the majority of the
HPWP, measured individually or as a bundle, mediate the relationship between work
uncertainty expressed either as task uncertainty or schedule uncertainty, and employee
overtime; a pattern of results which supports Hypothesis 3 (see Table 6).
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Table 4. Results of a Negative Binomial Model for Overtime
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Training 0.199*** 0.161***
(0.031) (0.040)
Task rotation 0.157*** 0.096**
(0.039) (0.051)
Productivity pay 0.235*** 0.029
(0.058) (0.075)
Gain sharing 0.086 0.079
(0.066) (0.093)
Teamwork 0.122*** 0.121**
(0.042) (0.054)
Discretion over methods 0.005 -0.005
(0.025) (0.030)
Discretion over schedule 0.018 -0.189***
(0.029) (0.044)
HR Bundle 0.027*** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.005)
HR Bundle2 0.001*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
Task uncertainty 0.148*** 0.126*** 0.142***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.024)
Schedule uncertainty 0.217*** 0.212*** 0.223***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -2.427*** -2.282*** -3.561*** -3.523*** -3.510***
(0.371) (0.371) (0.456) (0.478) (0.480)
Wald x2 1539.57 1497.09 1154.12 1121.94 1076.11
Log-Likelihood -30099.51 -30120.75 -22735.25 -20487.39 -20510.30
N 18,619 18,619 15,284 13,826 13,826
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Table 4 continued
Regression coe¢ cients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. Yesmeans
means that the indicated variable is included in each model equation. All regressions
include male, age, age2, tenure, tenure2, education, 1 work status dummy (fulltime),
5 types of employment contracts dummies, supervision, 4 occupation dummies, rm
size, 1 sector dummy, 11 industry dummies and 30 country dummies. Levels of signi-
cance: ***p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6. Tests for Mediating E¤ects
Sobel-Goodman Test Bootstrapping
(Baron and Kenny 1986) (Preacher and Hayes 2004)
Total e¤ect Total e¤ect Total e¤ect Total e¤ect
of task of schedule of task of schedule
uncertainty uncertainty uncertainty uncertainty
on overtime on overtime on overtime on overtime
being being being being
Variables mediated mediated mediated mediated
Training 4% 2% z= 2.42, p<0.05 z= 4.54, p<0.01
Task rotation 7% 3% z= 4.89, p<0.01 z= 5.91, p<0.01
Productivity pay -6% 2% z= -6.05, p<0.01 z= 3.75, p<0.01
Gain sharing 5% 0.4% z= 5.32, p<0.01 z= 1.75, p<0.1
Teamwork 8% 3% z= 6.05, p<0.01 z= 5.95, p<0.01
Discretion over methods 9% n.s. z= 6.24, p<0.01 n.s.
Discretion over schedule 2% 0.1% z= 11.11, p<0.01 z= 3.10, p<0.01
HR bundle 26% 1% z= 8.53, p<0.01 z= 3.15, p<0.01
HR bundle2 0.9% n.s. n.s. n.s.
Supplementary tests are conducted to assess whether estimates are robust to alternate
specications and samples. First, I run an additional regression including four di¤erent
types of training in an e¤ort to observe whether there are variations in the estimates
depending on the training activity applied. Training could be positively related to greater
worker time expenditure, but an issue arising is whether this positive link is due to the
nature of training activity or because during training employees are performing in a
di¤erent environment. Results show that training provided by the employer, training
paid by the employee, and di¤erent forms of on-site training and learning are positively
and signicantly associated with overtime, whereas for on-the-job training, I nd no
results. This absence of association might be attributed to the fact that during on-the-
job training employees do not lose so much time because of learning compared to other
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types of training, suggesting that other training activities better explain variations in
employee overtime. Second, previous literature has shown that the use of nonstandard
workers seems to be associated with work intensication, and there also seems to be
a strong association between work intensication and employees working in the public
sector (Green 2004). Therefore, I replicate the analyses in subsamples by dichotomizing
the sample into public and private sector employees, fulltime and part time employees,
and employees working under indenite versus employees more temporary contracts.
Results proved to vary marginally from those reported in Table 4.
3.6 Conclusions and Discussion
In synopsis, the core idea of the paper conjectures that although HPWP provide a num-
ber of benets to employees, from the other hand they could be one of the important
reasons explaining why employees work longer hours. Results provide evidence for this
argument and show that the increased e¤ort brought about due to the implementation
of HPWP is related to employee working overtime. Thus, ndings give support for the
work intensication argument. The same pattern of results is found when I test for the
mediating role of these practices on the relationship between uncertainty and overtime.
As it seems, uncertain environments are more likely to adopt a number of these prac-
tices, which in return positively mediate the relationship between work uncertainty and
employee overtime.
Yet, I fail to nd results for gain sharing and discretion over methods, while for
discretion over schedule I nd a negative and highly signicant coe¢ cient. This estimate
infers that giving exibility to choose schedule decreases employee overtime. This is
indirectly in accordance with previous literature which suggests that human resource
practices which allow choice over starting and nishing times, exible hour systems, and
individualscontrol over their own hours of work reduce job-to-home spillover (White
et al. 2003); dened as e¤ects of the employeesjobs on families such as too little time
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to carry out family responsibilities or jobs prevent employees from giving the time they
would like to their partner or family. Results infer that not all HPWP act as mediators
between work uncertainty and employee overtime.
The study has a number of strengths, but also limitations which suggest that ndings
should be interpreted with caution. First, even though the dataset comes from a rich cross
sectional survey which contains a more objective measure of work intensication, and its
design provides a very clear picture of the working conditions in Europe, one should bear
in mind that there are a number of cautions attached to the ndings regarding the cross
sectional nature of the research and the potential claims of causation. Second, although
a detailed methodological framework has been put in place in order to ensure that the
survey is carried out to the highest specications and scientic standards, self-report,
cross-sectional data are susceptible to biases associated with common variance method.
This bias is most problematic in studies in which data for both the predictor and the
criterion variable are obtained from the same source at one time. This problem lies in the
di¢ culty of determining whether observed covariance among the constructs examined is
attributable to valid relationships or to common method variance (Podsako¤et al. 2003).
A third point claiming for attention is the notion of complementarity which although
very intuitively appealing, it is not easy to be measured. Prior work evaluating this
concept has employed divergent measures of human resource complementarity, such as
arbitrarily grouping practices intro three or four types of human resource practice bundles
or using factor analysis to generate an index of practices with very mixed empirical results
(Delaney and Huselid 1996). Following other authors (e.g. MacDu¢ e 1995), this paper
is using a less restrictive strategy which allows a range of combinations and as a result
practices are not neatly classied into discrete types. However, there might be other
practices a¤ecting employee overtime not included in the bundle. Fourth, the pattern
of relationships found in this study is consistent with theoretical arguments suggesting
that uncertainty might cause the adoption of HPWP and not the other way around,
thus providing initial support for the mediated e¤ects of work uncertainty on employee
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overtime. However, a multiple mediator approach implies a specic causal order among
phenomena, and the cross-sectional nature of the data does not allow making causal
inferences regarding chains of e¤ects.
Adopting a cross-lagged panel design in future research can address these issues and
give a more rigorous test of these mediated e¤ects. Also, scholars who are interested
in understanding the impact of human resource practices could give more attention to
work intensication inferring that benets attributed to these practices could be achieved
through work intensication in the form of longer hours spent at work. It may represent
an extreme argument given that the dataset employed for the purposes of the study does
not contain any measure of productivity, and thus does not allow making predictions
for the other side of the story. Still, ndings can challenge previous studies and call
into question existing ndings that measure productivity without taking into account
the change in the number of hours worked. Finally, the nding of this study can o¤er
suggestions to managers who seek to introduce human resource practices in an e¤ort to
improve performance, supporting that maintaining a balance between the adoption of
human resource practices and work intensication might be of some importance.
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Chapter 4
Learning Through Task Variety
Versus Task Specialization:
Climbing a Stairway to Heaven.
Who Gets There?
4.1 Introduction
Relatively recent literature on organization and individual learning has indicated a num-
ber of implicit and explicit references of how assignments should be designed and how the
learning rate might be a¤ected by task specialization, related or unrelated task variation
(Darr, Argote, and Epple 1995; Fischer and Ittner 1999; Schilling, Vidal, Ployhart, and
Marangoni 2003). As it is supported, o¤ering exposure to a broad range of tasks is im-
portant because employees who switch between multiple assignments are provided with
diverse experiences which allows them to gain breadth of knowledge, resolve or tackle
problems more e¤ectively and achieve higher productivity levels (Schilling et al. 2003).
On the other hand, the role of task specialization has been mentioned as an important
factor in driving rm and employee learning, and has been found to be very tightly
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connected to higher productivity since the days of Adam Smith (1776). As argued, ded-
ication to a single activity can maximize the reliability of experience, mainly because it
allows task repetition and a deeper understanding of the problem which can yield higher
e¢ ciency and higher productivity levels at a specic task (Shilling et al. 2003; Boh,
Slaughter, and Espinosa 2007; Narayanan, Balasubramanian, and Swaminathan 2009).
Apart from their learning implications, understanding whether individuals can lever-
age experience to improve their learning at work seems to have central implications for
their career prospects as well. Literature on careers has given attention on the impor-
tance of task assignments supporting that they are a primary source of career learning
and very critical for employees who seek to move up the career ladder more quickly (Cam-
pion, Cheraskin, and Stevens 1994). Yet, little research or theory has focused on di¤erent
forms of tasks assignments as proactive means of enhancing the value of employee learn-
ing for career development. This is important both for managers and employees because
in leveraging experience they need to weigh the gains from specialized versus diverse
experience in inuencing not only learning and productivity, but also employeesability
to take more responsibility and advance their career within an organization.
The paper focuses on the employee learning and career advancement implications of
task assignments in conjunction. It sheds light on this issue by disaggregating di¤erent
task assignments, and focuses mainly on two processes. First, it attempts to determine
whether task assignments in the form of related and unrelated task rotation help employ-
ees draw linkages between bodies of knowledge and facilitate their career advancement
in the rm. Second, it compares the contribution of more to less task complexity on
each outcome respectively. Third, it observes whether employee learning and career ad-
vancement can be better leveraged through the possible complementarities between task
assignments and employee discretion.
In essence, the paper extends prior research in three directions. First, although pre-
vious work has tested whether individual learning can be best leveraged through task
specialization or through some degree of variation by providing good insights, yet the
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evidence is scarce. Results seem somehow inconclusive and they often vary depending
on the context. In fact, many times the context of the empirical investigation of these
questions has been limited to specic learning domains (Schilling et al. 2003) or to a
single industry (Boh et al. 2007). Here, hypotheses are evaluated by using broader
datasets from the fourth and the fth wave of the European Working Conditions Sur-
vey (EWCS) which present an overview of the working conditions of nearly 30,000 and
44,000 employed and self-employed individuals respectively. Second, research on careers
has examined whether rotating employees is a means through which individuals leverage
experience and develop their careers (Campion et al. 1994). Here, it is noted though
that the type of rotation might be of di¤erent importance in inuencing learning and,
by extension, the way individual careers are shaped. Third, the paper is departing from
previous research by supporting the idea that individuals might need a certain level of
discretion within each task, and addresses how di¤erent tasks and discretion mechanisms
may interactively contribute to individual learning and employee career prospects.
4.2 Theory and Hypotheses
Earlier studies in psychology show that, at the individual level, task variety may enhance
an employees ability to learn by facilitating the development of abstract principles that
can be applied to di¤erent, but somehow related tasks or problems (Schmidt 1975).
Tyre and von Hippel (1997) explain that engineers sometimes need to look at a problem
in di¤erent contexts in order to be able to understand it better. Also, Loewenstein,
Thompson, and Gentner (1999) present a similar phenomenon in their study where they
report that students working on di¤erent scenarios are able to more rapidly develop a
cognitive understanding than students focusing on a single scenario. More recent studies
such that of Shilling et al. (2003) nd that, at the individual level, learning is greater
for employees working on di¤erent but similar tasks and lower for employees who are
either specialized or work on totally unrelated tasks. Similarly, the work of Narayanan
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et al. (2009) shows that some exposure to variety enhances learning and productivity,
nevertheless too much exposure to variety or very deep specialization could actually
impede them. At the group and organizational level, the study of Boh et al. (2007)
reveals that learning from variety is more signicant than learning from specialization.
In contrast, other studies claim that task enlargement increases the errors employees
make while learning, whereas specialization decreases the time spent in learning and
the frequency of errors employees make while dealing with new tasks (Campion and
McClelland 1991; 1993). In many cases, specialized experience seems to impact more
individual productivity, inferring that learning from working on the same task enables
employees to gain familiarity and better understanding of the task (Boh et al. 2007).
As extension to that, tasks assignments enhance the value of work experience and facil-
itate career development. Because of these positive outcomes, many rms have started to
create new environments by reorganizing work activities. They have placed considerable
attention in promoting increased exibility through cross-training where the individual
worker has the opportunity to work in di¤erent tasks (Shafer, Nembhard, and Uzumeri
2001). Among the common ways to provide employee exposure to a wider range of ex-
periences is the notion of employee rotation (Campion et al. 1994). This practice refers
to lateral transfers between assignments and it has been discussed in the literature as a
means to improve employee skills and abilities at work. As employees move up to other
jobs, they need to be aware of di¤erent business aspects and rotation seems to facilitate
that process. Support comes from surveys that have reported that organizations, par-
ticularly large rms, frequently use rotation to develop managers (Foreman 1967; Saari,
Johnson, McLaughlin, and Zimmerle 1988). In particular, it has been discussed in the
context of developing junior employees to become top managers (Eriksson and Ortega
2006) and managers into generalists (London 1985).
In contrast, exposure to specialization although increases learning, may actually hin-
der the career advancement of employees either because it is often too hard to replace
them or because specialized employees are less equipped to work on di¤erent tasks. Past
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research provides support for this idea and suggests that exposure to task variety through
rotation is a better learning mechanism and it is much more protable than specialization
(Meyer 1994; Ortega 2001).Without rotation employees mainly focus on a single activ-
ity. Although specializing in one activity provides adequate opportunity for repetition
and deeper learning, still from a learning perspective, it is claimed that employees who
rotate accumulate more human capital than employees who do not rotate (Eriksson and
Ortega 2006). However, not all rotation might generate equal useful knowledge and skill.
According to the task variety argument, learning is more likely to be improved to the
extent that rotation requires di¤erent skills in each position. Thus, one would expect
a positive relationship between rotation and employee learning and career opportunities
within an organization, especially when rotation encompasses the acquisition of di¤erent
skills. Stated more formally:
Hypothesis 1a. Rotation will be positively related to employee learning.
Hypothesis 1b. Employees involved in rotation will have a higher likelihood
of advancing their career than employees who do not rotate; especially when
rotating positions require di¤erent skills.
Another way through which employees are exposed to variety is job complexity. The
literature on job and task design seems to associate complexity with enrichment and
many times the terms are used interchangeably (Hackman and Lawler 1971; Hackman
and Oldham 1975, 1976; Pierce and Dunham 1976; Gri¢ th 1982; Campbell 1988). Hack-
man and Oldham (1980) dene complex jobs as those characterized by high levels of
autonomy, skill variety, identity, signicance, and feedback. In a later study, Campbell
(1988) proposes a framework in which any task characteristic that implies an increase in
information load, diversity, or rate of information change can be considered a contributor
to complexity. When jobs are complex, employees are expected to engage simultaneously
on multiple dimensions of their work, in contrast to less complex jobs which actually
restrain such option (Hackman and Oldham 1980; Deci, Connell, and Ryan 1989; Old-
76
ham and Cummings 1996). In addition, evidence shows that complex jobs can have a
substantial impact on a variety of work-related outcomes, such as exercise more initia-
tive (Frese, Kring, Soose, and Zempel 1996; Speier and Frese 1997; Frese, Garst, and
Fay 2007). They help also achieve higher supervisor ratings of performance, dened as
the employee development of new ideas, than more routine jobs (Oldham and Cummings
1996; Tierney and Farmer 2002; 2004). On the contrary, employees might exhibit lowest
performance and satisfaction when their jobs are lowest in complexity and their skills are
weaker (Oldham, Kulik, and Stepina 1991).
Again, the notable point here is the emphasis on the reactions of the individual to the
task. Engaging on multiple dimensions of work and being exposed to more information
increases the rate of employee learning. As a consequence, it further enables employ-
ees to show broad ranges of accomplishments and that they possess the necessary skills
to perform other kinds of tasks or master new responsibilities. Whereas, less complex
tasks sometimes tend to promote underuse of skills and abilities which might undermine
learning and prevent workers from demonstrating readiness for more responsible, chal-
lenging, and remunerative work. Therefore, on the basis of the task variety approach, it
is hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 2a. Task complexity will be positively related to employee learn-
ing.
Hypothesis 2b. Employees who work on complex tasks will have a higher
likelihood of advancing their career than employees who work on less complex
tasks.
If jobs include a varied set of tasks, individuals may need a certain level of discretion
within each task. The literature on employee discretion1 denes autonomy as a practice
which brings more exibility at work allowing employees to organize their work on their
1The literature uses di¤erent terminology to refer to employee discretion including job autonomy
(Hackman and Oldham 1976), task control or participation in decision making (Karasek 1979).
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own by choosing the methods and/or their work schedule (Hackman and Oldham 1975;
1976). Designing work to provide discretion is associated with giving employees the
opportunity to develop new skills, master a wider range of tasks and responsibilities
(Parker 1998; Grant and Parker 2009) as well as increased performance (Osterman 1995;
Wood, de Menezes, and Lasaosa 2003; Ortega 2009). Complementary research claims
that employees who have discretion can considerably a¤ect the quality of production
(Ichniowski and Shaw 1999; Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, and Kalleberg 2000).
In the case that jobs are complex, it is too costly for the rm to know which actions
are optimal, and it is better to let the agent decide which action to take, while when
jobs are less complex or more repetitive, employees need less discretion (Prendergast
2002). Therefore, adding discretion to their job may help employees gain exibility in
each task. The higher the level of discretion, the greater the employee involvement and
employees tend to learn more when they are more involved with their jobs. In extension,
autonomy could signal to rms that employees have the ability to take broader roles
(Parker 2000, 2007) and to be assigned to positions that involve greater responsibilities
(Ortega 2009). Frequently, it is considered a prerequisite for anyone who plans to stay
visible as a job candidate, mainly because autonomous employees are held responsible
for work outcomes, and signicant accomplishments can be attributed to them. Those
employees can demonstrate potential success in positions of higher responsibility, and
therefore are more likely to be assigned to higher positions than employees who do not
have autonomy at work. Thus, according to the task variety approach:
Hypothesis 3a. Employee discretion will strengthen the positive relation-
ship between task variety and employee learning.
Hypothesis 3b. Employee discretion will strengthen the positive relation-
ship between task variety and employee career advancement.
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4.3 Data description
Hypotheses are evaluated by analyzing data from the fourth and the fth wave of the
EWCS carried out in 2005 and 2010. The surveys present an overview of the working
conditions of almost 30,000 and 44,000 employed and self-employed individuals respec-
tively. For the purposes of this study only the rst category is taken into consideration in
the tested sample. The data contain information on employee learning, career prospects,
and cover di¤erent questions pertaining to task variety, task specialization, and employee
discretion. All of them are based on employee self-reporting.
The dependent variables are employee learning and career prospects. The former
represents a dichotomous variable showing whether the job of an individual involves
learning new things, and the latter represents a categorical variable indicating whether
an employees job o¤ers good prospects for career advancement. The rst independent
variables of interest are measured with one question about unrelated task rotation indi-
cating whether employees rotate to tasks which require di¤erent skills and one on related
task rotation indicating whether employees rotate to tasks which require similar skills.
Also, one question on complex tasks is included showing whether an employees main job
involves complex tasks and one measuring the contrary, dened as monotonous tasks.
Finally, four variables for employee discretion are taken into consideration which depict
whether employees are able to choose or change the order of tasks, methods of work,
speed or rate of work, and whether they have discretion to apply their own ideas. All
are measured using dichotomous questions, except the latter which is categorical. For
the rst three items I have constructed an index2, dened as discretion over methods.
Previous research highlights that employee rotation is very closely aligned with certain
human resource practices such as training (Osterman 1994, 2000) and teamwork (Erickson
and Ortega 2006). In addition, employee discretion at work is part of a wider high-
performance work system (Ortega 2009). It seems that a complementary relationship
2All items have been standardized to have a 0 mean and a standard deviation equal to 1 before I
construct the index. For discretion over methods, Cronbachs alpha is 0. 0.75 and 0.79 respectively.
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exists among these practices, and the implementation of the one usually facilitates the
implementation of the other. Therefore, two variables on human resource practices are
dened, training and teamwork, as main controls. The rst variable is constructed out
of three di¤erent types of training mentioned in the survey: training provided by the
employer, training paid by the employee, and on-the-job training. The variable takes 1
in case of having received any of the three training activities and 0 otherwise. The second
variable is also measured dichotomously and shows whether an employees job involves
doing all or part of his work in a team.
A number of other controls are also added aiming to capture potential exogenous
e¤ects stemming from the heterogeneity in the sample. One binary variable for gender
is included in order to capture gender di¤erences. Continuous variables for age and age2
are added as a proxy for work experience (Dokko, Wilk, and Rothbard 2009) and tenure
and tenure2 as a proxy for ability (Ortega 2009). To account for the schooling level
of employees, a categorical variable is used about the highest level of education that
employees have completed3. Employee skills is also included to account for ability with
a variable coded -1 if employeew need further training to cope well with their duties, 0 if
their duties correspond well with present skills and 1 if they possess skills to cope with
more demanding duties. To deal further with the individual heterogeneity, the linear
e¤ects of the number of employees under each employees supervision, and number of
hours worked are also taken into account along with a categorical variable for rm size,
and dummy controls for sector, type of employment contract, occupation, industry, and
country4. Next, Table 1 reports summary statistics for all main variables.
3One-digit ISCED code.
4The occupational and industry dummies are based on the International Standard Classication of
Occupations (ISCO-88) and countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Lux-
embourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
EWCS 2005 EWCS 2010
Variables N Mean Std.Dev. N Mean Std.Dev.
1. Career 24,663 1.655 1.238 39,578 1.751 1.203
2. Learning 24,837 0.731 0.444 41,118 0.680 0.466
3. Unrelated task rotation 24,753 0.397 0.489 40,915 0.343 0.475
4. Related task rotation 24,753 0.103 0.304 40,915 0.094 0.292
5. Complex tasks 24,668 0.624 0.484 40,960 0.562 0.496
6. Monotonous tasks 24,784 0.426 0.494 41,021 0.457 0.498
4.4 Models and Results
Hypotheses are tested using the following model specication:
yi = 0 + 1Xi1 + 2Xi2 + 3Xi1Xi2 + 4Controlsi + "i
Where 3 is the coe¢ cient corresponding to the product. I estimate a series of mod-
els using logit for learning (columns denoted as a) in conjunction with ordered logit for
career (columns denoted as b). Conducting two separate sets of regressions for 2005 and
2010 lead two similar results, shown in Table 2. Moving from left to right, estimates from
the rst two identical models indicate that unrelated task rotation and task complexity
have a positive and very signicant relationship with employee learning. In contrast,
rotating tasks which require similar skills show a negative and insignicant relationship
with employee learning, while monotonous tasks show a negative and highly signicant
relation with it. Discretion over methods and discretion over ideas show a signicantly
positive coe¢ cient as well. As observed, the signs and signicance of the estimated
coe¢ cients are quite stable across the two models. A similar pattern of results is ob-
served in Model 2 when estimating the relationship between task assignments and career
prospects. The coe¢ cient of unrelated task rotation is positive and marginally signicant
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for 2005, however negative and not di¤erent from zero at a statistically signicant level
for 2010. The coe¢ cient of related task rotation is negative and marginally signicant.
Furthermore, working in complex tasks seems to be positively and signicantly related
to career prospects whereas working in monotonous tasks has the opposite relationship.
Regarding the discretion variables, both show positive and signicant signs. Estimations
give support to the hypotheses which are consistent with the notion that task variation
instead of task specialization is positively related to employee learning and employee
career prospects, with very minor exceptions.
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Table 2. Estimates of Logit and Ordered Logit Models
Variables Model 1: Learning () Model 2: Career()
(2005) (2010) (2005) (2010)
Unrelated task rotation 0.572*** 0.574*** 0.054* -0.002
(0.050) (0.040) (0.031) (0.026)
1.771 1.775 1.056 0.998
Related task rotation -0.101 -0.003 -0.081* -0.076**
(0.066) (0.052) (0.048) (0.038)
0.904 0.997 0.923 0.927
Complex tasks 1.549*** 1.635*** 0.247*** 0.272***
(0.045) (0.035) (0.031) (0.025)
4.706 5.127 1.280 1.312
Monotonous tasks -0.312*** -0.188*** -0.349*** -0.335***
(0.044) (0.034) (0.029) (0.023)
0.732 0.828 0.706 0.715
Discretion over methods 0.229*** 0.264*** 0.067*** 0.057***
(0.026) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015)
1.258 1.302 1.069 1.059
Discretion over ideas 0.239*** 0.184*** 0.274*** 0.263***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010)
1.270 1.203 1.316 1.300
Training 0.899*** 0.871*** 0.311*** 0.382***
(0.046) (0.035) (0.030) (0.024)
2.457 2.389 1.365 1.465
Teamwork 0.261*** 0.170*** 0.113*** 0.126***
(0.046) (0.036) (0.031) (0.025)
1.299 1.185 1.120 1.134
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.310 0.315 0.076 0.085
Log Likelihood -7465.80 -12099.90 -26930.76 -39266.58
Observations 19,140 28,811 19,009 28,229
Note: The table reports estimated coe¢ cients, and standard errors (in parentheses).Italised
numbers represent the odds ratios. All regressions include controls for Male, Age, Age2,
Tenure, Tenure2; Education, Skills, Supervision, Hours, 5 type of contracts, 9 occupation
dummies, rm size, public sector, 16 industry dummies, and 29 country dummies. Levels
of signicance: ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05. * p<0.1.
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Table 3 presents the results after introducing the interaction terms. In general, the
coe¢ cients keep the same sign, however some of them lose signicance. Support is
still provided from the direct relationship of unrelated task rotation and learning, as
well as the relationship between complex tasks, monotonous tasks, the two discretion
mechanisms, and the outcome variables. Among the indirect e¤ects, the interaction
between employee discretion over methods and complex tasks is negative and signicant
in model 3 for the year 2010. Thus, hypothesis 3a is not supported. The interaction
between employee discretion over methods and complex tasks is positive and signicant
indicating that employee discretion intensies the relationship between complex tasks
and career prospects. This pattern of result supports hypothesis 3b. Interestingly and
contrary to what it has been hypothesized, the inclusion of the interaction term between
employee discretion over ideas and monotonous tasks is positive and highly signicant
inferring that when employees work in monotonous tasks, giving them discretion to apply
their own ideas is related to better career prospects.
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Table 3. Estimates of Logit and Ordered Logit Models
Variables Model 1: Learning () Model 2: Career()
(2005) (2010) (2005) (2010)
Unrelated task rotation 0.560*** 0.616*** 0.055 -0.045
(0.096) (0.078) (0.069) (0.057)
Related task rotation -0.114 0.025 -0.058 -0.018
(0.124) (0.101) (0.096) (0.078)
Complex tasks 1.462*** 1.587*** 0.277*** 0.338***
(0.086) (0.070) (0.064) (0.052)
Monotonous tasks -0.390*** -0.249*** -0.474*** -0.465***
(0.085) (0.069) (0.062) (0.051)
Discretion over methods 0.316*** 0.311*** 0.002 0.021
(0.048) (0.036) (0.036) (0.028)
Discretion over ideas 0.212*** 0.175*** 0.257*** 0.246***
(0.029) (0.023) (0.022) (0.018)
Discretion over methods x -0.082 -0.094** 0.049 -0.037
Unrelated task rotation (0.058) (0.044) (0.038) (0.031)
Discretion over methods x -0.103 -0.006 -0.027 -0.005
Related task rotation (0.077) (0.060) (0.058) (0.046)
Discretion over methods x -0.018 0.013 0.096*** 0.065**
Complex tasks (0.052) (0.041) (0.037) (0.029)
Discretion over methods x -0.081 -0.046 -0.014 0.031
Monotonous tasks (0.051) (0.040) (0.036) (0.028)
Discretion over ideas x -0.003 -0.029 0.001 0.016
Unrelated task rotation (0.034) (0.028) (0.023) (0.020)
Discretion over ideas x -0.007 -0.012 -0.012 -0.026
Related task rotation (0.045) (0.038) (0.034) (0.029)
Discretion over ideas x 0.036 0.023 -0.008 -0.027
Complex tasks (0.031) (0.026) (0.022) (0.019)
Discretion over ideas x 0.026 0.022 0.048** 0.056***
Monotonous tasks (0.031) (0.026) (0.022) (0.018)
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Table 3 continued
Variables Model 1: Learning () Model 2: Career()
(2005) (2010) (2005) (2010)
Training 0.898*** 0.871*** 0.313*** 0.384***
(0.046) (0.035) (0.030) (0.024)
Teamwork 0.262*** 0.173*** 0.113*** 0.127***
(0.046) (0.036) (0.031) (0.025)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.310 0.315 0.077 0.085
Log Likelihood -7461.81 -12094.40 -26921.88 -39255.26
Observations 19,140 28,811 19,009 28,229
Note: The table reports estimated coe¢ cients, and standard errors (in parentheses). All
regressions include controls for Male, Age, Age2, Tenure,Tenure2; Education, Skills,
Supervision, Hours, 5 type of contracts, 9 occupation dummies, rm size, public sector,
16 industry dummies, and 29 country dummies. Levels of signicance: ***p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In nonlinear models, however, the interpretation of the coe¢ cient of the interaction
terms is not as straightforward as in linear models. Scholars suggest that the method for
testing an interaction e¤ect in nonlinear models di¤ers substantially from that used in
OLS, mainly because of two reasons. First, regressors marginal e¤ect does not equal the
variables model coe¢ cient and the value of this marginal e¤ect varies with the value of
all model variables. Second, in nonlinear models there is no measure of model t similar
to the R-square in OLS, and, as a result, model assessment is limited to testing the
joint signicance of all model variables (see more in Wiersama and Bowen 2009). Recent
inquiries suggest that in order to identify the true interaction e¤ect for nonlinear model,
supplementary analysis is needed in which interactions e¤ects can be better examined
graphically in order to provide a more complete assessment of the nature of an interaction
e¤ect (Norton, Wang, and Ai 2004; Wiersama and Bowen 2009)5.
5Norton et al. (2004) present illustrations for calculating and graphing the magnitude and signicance
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Taking into account the aforementioned issues, the categorical dependent variable of
career prospects is converted to a dummy and separate logit models for each interaction
term are introduced. In particular, eight interaction terms are added sequentially for each
survey; four for employee discretion over methods and each task assignment, and four for
employee discretion over ideas and each task assignment. Scatter graphs are generated
which illustrate additional analysis for logit models with predicted probabilities on the
x-axis and plot the interaction e¤ect calculated by the conventional linear method and
by the method suggested by Norton et al. (2004) against predicted probabilities. Bellow,
I illustrate graphically the interactions that are found to be signicant. As observed,
interactions between discretion over methods and complex tasks for 2005 and 2010 are
statistically signicant for all the observations. The interactions between discretion over
ideas and monotonous tasks, however, vary widely with the majority of the observations
being positive and signicant.
Graph 1. z-statistics of Interaction E¤ects after Logit: Discretion over Methods
and Complex Tasks
EWCS 2005 EWCS 2010
of an interaction e¤ect after logit models.
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Graph 2. z-statistics of Interaction E¤ects after Logit: Discretion over Ideas and
Monotonous Tasks.
EWCS 2005 EWCS 2010
In addition to the main analysis reported above, estimates after logit are compared
with that of a linear probability6 where the interaction e¤ect is simply the coe¢ cient of the
interaction term. OLS gives predicted values outside the (0,1) range but provides more
accurate predictions regarding the interaction terms, whereas logistic regression gives
more accurate predictions of probabilities on the dependent outcome. Both regression
analyses produced similar results and thus, proved consistent
4.5 Conclusions and Discussion
In synopsis, results indicate that employees exhibit higher learning and higher intentions
for career growth when their jobs involve unrelated task rotation, complex tasks, and
discretion. Whereas, employees show lowest learning, and career prospects when they
work under related task rotation or monotonous tasks. When interaction terms are
introduced to test how the relationship between task variety and career prospects depends
on the magnitude of employee discretion, ndings reveal positive and signicant e¤ects for
6OLS coe¢ cients measure changes in expected values of career prospects, while logistic coe¢ cients
measure changes in the log odds that career prospects equal 1.
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two interactions; for the interactions between discretion over methods and complex tasks,
and interestingly, for the interactions between discretion over ideas and monotonous tasks.
Overall, the stability of the results across estimations lends credence to ndings.
The estimated results shed light in understanding the relation between various tasks
assignments, learning, and career prospects. In essence, they are consistent with argu-
ments suggesting that task variation stimulates employees to develop a wider understand-
ing of the tasks than they would if they had performed only one type of task. Additionally,
di¤erent tasks seem also to facilitate career growth. However, due to the cross-sectional
nature of the data, the direction of causality is not always clear. Future research could
address this issue by utilizing a longitudinal design with repeated measurement of key
variables at appropriate intervals that allow tests of reciprocity. Also, the paper examines
individual-level data, therefore one must exercise caution in generalizing the ndings to
other levels. Future research should attempt to replicate these ndings at various levels
of analysis to determine whether there are systematic di¤erences in the ways that task
variation impacts learning and career prospects.
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